Expertiza_Wiki - User contributions [en]

CSC 379:Week 5, Group 6

2007-08-03T21:45:22Z

Jjpittar:

=Safety and Internet Social Networks=
==Overview==
==Solutions==
===Limit Access in Public Places===
'''Idea''' 
Limit or eliminate the ability of individuals to access social networking sites in public places, such as schools or libraries, as in the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deleting_Online_Predators_Act_of_2006 Deleting Online Predator's Act of 2006] 
'''Rationale and Arguments''' 
Proponents of this approach often cite that while the primary duty to protect and educate children falls with parents, locations such as schools and libraries are places where minors often lack parental supervision, and access to social networking sites should be limited to locations where parents can monitor the activity of their children. Schools and libraries, they further contend, are places of education, and while this approach often allows exemptions for the educational study of social networking, government-maintained computers and public institutions of education are not the appropriate place for online socialization. Also, they note that while the current availability of the Internet in libraries makes the resources of cyberspace available to all, it also provides the the questionable resource of a free, quick, simple, and wide-reaching way for adults to contact minors through social networks. Limitation of social networking sites in the public, it is argued, would at least make such access and contact somewhat more difficult, while leaving the majority of the benefits of the Internet intact.
 
Opponents of this approach question how much it would truly accomplish in keeping so-called "predators" at bay, as well as the true cost for such limited gains. They point out that preventing those who target children from accessing social networking sites in libraries does not prevent them from finding other ways to gain access - at home, work, or with friends. Also, while carefully limiting the behavior of children when outside of parental supervision seems a good idea in principle, a significant problem arises in attempting to legislate precisely what constitutes a "social networking site." While such sites are easily recognizable by those familiar with the technology, the current legislative definition, per the DOPA, would potentially limit access to a number of websites generally agreed to not be of a social networking nature, including Yahoo!, Slashdot, and perhaps, in the future, even Google. The implication of this fact would be to severely mitigate, if not essentially nullify entirely, the value of offering public access to the Internet in libraries at all.
 
'''Legality'''
 
This approach to promoting safety on social networking sites appears to be entirely legal, a point underwritten by the fact that there is presently an act in Congress with the aim of making this particular approach into a federal law. The only presently reasonably foreseeable challenge to the law on Constitutional grounds would be the broad but historically ineffectual assertion that the tenth amendment to the Constitution prohibits federal involvement in schools and libraries.

===Require Age, Consent or Identity Verification via Credit Card===
'''Idea''' 
This approach to ensuring safety on social networking sites would require users to submit credit card information upon signing up for the service. This information would guarantee any of a number of data about a user, such as age, the possession of informed parental consent, or the validity of identity information displayed on the site. Variations on this approach include the use of debit cards or bank accounts in addition to credit cards. 
'''Rationale and Arguments''' 
The idea of requiring users of social networking sites to submit valid information is nothing new. At present, no system exists which compels users to definitively verify much if anything about themselves. Some social networking sites, such as Facebook, have preliminary checks to help ensure that a member really is from a particular area or academic institution, but for the most part these measures are easily circumvented. Proponents of requiring the entry of credit card information to sign up for social networking sites claim that this approach would provide a more effective manner of verifying identity than any measures currently in place, and would not require the establishment of any new identification system. Presentation of credit card information, they argue, would require that adults use their true names and ages when signing up for the site, and that minors have true parental consent, in order to create a social networking profile. Thus, parents would be kept more informed about their children's online behavior, and online predators would be easier to identify and monitor, screen, or eliminate from the service, as they would not be able to hide behind aliases. Additionally, potential first-time offenders would not be able to mislead minors about their identities, as names and ages of cardholders would be verifiable. 

Opponents of this approach, however, adamantly insist that it would do more harm than good. As with all legislative approaches, the problem exists of legally defining precisely what constitutes a social networking site. Perhaps more importantly, current wide definitions of social networks would require a user to submit credit card information to a wealth of websites, putting him or her at risk for unauthorized transactions by unscrupulous employees or hackers, and perhaps even identity theft. Companies would also have to shoulder the burden of storing and securing databases of very sensitive information, and would most likely be liable for breaches. Further, this approach would unfairly exclude from social networks all adults who had no credit card or bank account, and all children of such adults, as well. While adults who signed up for social networking services would in theory have their identities verified, many point out that children, especially teens, are fully (if not legitimately) capable of obtaining a parent's credit card information either without informing the parent of the purpose, or entirely without consent. While this fault does ultimately reside with the parent, it nonetheless poses a significant challenge to those who claim that parental oversight of social networking activity would be achieved by means of credit card entry. 
'''Legality''' 
Though perhaps unwise, this policy does seem to be legal. Any institution can require the submission of credit information, if by no other means than simply charging a trivial fee for its services.

===Require Age, Consent, or Identity Verification via National Identification===
'''Idea''' 
This approach would require the establishment of a national identification card program to cover United States citizens. Potential members of social networking sites would submit their identification number and confirming password or PIN, and identity information on the site would correspond to the information in a national database associated with that individual. In the event that a minor signed up for such a site, consent would ideally be obtained directly from the parent or guardian directly from the social networking organization. 
'''Rationale and Arguments'''
 
Arguments both for and against establishing identity through a [http://news.com.com/National+ID+cards+on+the+way/2100-1028_3-5573414.html national identification system] largely parallel their counterparts for and against establishing identity by means of credit card information. Proponents of this approach specifically indicate that four distinct advantages present themselves in the national identification scheme over the credit card scheme. Firstly, if all individuals were to have an identification card, then it would not be difficult for those without credit cards or bank accounts, or their children, to use social networking sites. Further, the information presented by minors to such sites would be accurate - something that cannot be guaranteed by the credit card system, as minors are not cardholders. Parental consent would also be less subject to circumvention, as children would be ostensibly less likely to give fraudulent consent when the parent was contacted directly - perhaps by phone, postal mail, or email - rather than when mere possession of a credit card. Finally, the risk of the theft of credit information would not be present in a system which did not retain that information at all.
 
Opponents, however, see more danger in the proposal of a national identity program alone, notwithstanding its use for social networking sites, than in the idea of using credit information to verify social networking information. National identification at all, they argue, would be a dangerous step in the direction of tighter government monitoring of American citizens, and would eventually mean the renunciation of further precepts of privacy, whether they be rights or privileges. Additionally, a centralized federal database of identity information, as well as the association of this information with numerous social networking accounts, would place users at perhaps an even greater risk for identity theft than any other safety scheme herein discussed. The registration of minors in particular poses an entirely different set of concerns, largely unrelated to this topic. It would be likely, as well, that any national identification program would be used, as social security numbers are now, for a number of different purposes relating to private information, meaning that a failure in the security of a social networking site could lead to a host of other problems for the site's users. Possession of parental consent by minors, while more likely than in the credit card scheme, would neither be guaranteed by these means. Undoubtedly, however, the most daunting problem with this idea is the establishment of a national identity program itself, which would most likely have to be government-mandated in order to ensure accuracy. Finally, it is doubtful that this would provide a complete fix to the problem, as most social networking sites are open to locations outside of the United States, which would be unaffected by any identity confirmation requirements in this nation, as when a teen from Michigan traveled to the nation of Jordan to meet someone with whom she was acquainted on a social network.
 
'''Legality''' 
While no specific legislation exists to prohibit this particular approach, previous attempts to begin a national identification card program has met with significant opposition, both from private organizations and [http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9026324 from the states,] and would probably be challenged in the courts if enacted.
===Restricting or Prohibiting Access...===
'''Overview of Idea''' 
The central idea for forcibly protecting the safety of minors on social networking sites is to limit access to such sites by those considered most likely to become potential victims, or those most likely to become potential abusers, or both. While this eliminates the risk of potentially unsafe incidents between these two groups, it raises serious questions, as well. Of course, moreover, the ability to block a specific portion of the population from social networking sites also requires that their computer usage be tracked and monitored, an idea alone with which many people take issue. Either a suspiciously Orwellian technological solution or vast armies of parole officers would be necessary for a number of the suggestions below.

...by Age 
Due to the Children's Online Privacy and Protection Act, children under the age of 13 cannot sign up for memberships to any website without "verifiable" parental consent. Myspace, one of the major online social networking sites, requires its users to be at least 14 years of age, or rather, to report that they are at least 14 years of age, to register for an account. However, many wonder if this age limit is too low - whether 14-year-olds can fully grasp the possible repercussions of exposing personal data - everything from one's likes and dislikes, to a list of friends, to potentially exploitable photographs - online. There have been suggestions to raise this limit to anywhere between sixteen and eighteen. While this change would manifest a significant negative impact on the business and user base of several social networking sites, it would certainly put younger children out of harm's way. More importantly, however, is the statement that imposing this limit by means of legislation would make about children's rights, and the right of parents to govern their child's behavior as they see fit. Children's rights, relative to adults, are curtailed, to be sure. How many activities, however, purely innocent and recreational if not for the few who exploit the system, must the government legislate away in the name of safety? Do they truly have the right to do so? On the other hand, if it prevents abductions or abuse, does the question of authority really matter? More immediately, however, is the question of how, without a national ID card program, children who desire to use social networks can be expected to report their actual ages.
 
...by Felons 
By law, individuals who commit a felony already forfeit a number of their rights as United States citizens, such as the right to vote or to hold certain political offices. It has been suggested that future social networking legislation also force felons to forfeit the right to create or use a social networking account. Essentially, the thinking behind this approach reasons that commission of a felony may be a "risk factor" for exploitation of children online - that felons are more likely than law-abiding citizens to be or to become online predators. Unfortunately, this is largely unsubstantiated, especially for those whose infractions have no relation to child exploitation or cyber-crime. Opponents argue that the punishment of prohibition of online social networking does not universally fit felony crimes. Thus, this policy might be challenged as "unusual" punishment on a Constitutional basis. 
...by the Mentally Ill 
Much as with the commission of a felony, some believe there to be a correlation between severe mental illness and the tendency to exploit or abuse minors. In fact, it has been argued that the desire to sexually abuse children in and of itself constitutes a mental illness. In many states, those who have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution, and thus judged to be a danger to themselves or others, are prohibited from owning a firearm. The idea has been brought forth that these people, having already been judged by professionals to be a danger in some capacity, be barred from social networking sites, as they there could pose a new sort of danger to the site's members. This is somewhat more accepted than the idea of banning all felons, as mental illness more closely relates to sociopathic or unpredictable behavior than does the commission of most crimes, but some still see it as the repression of a group whose members need more help than regulation. 
...by the Domestically Violent 
Prohibition of the domestically violent from using social networking sites has been suggested, not so much as a means of protecting the young, but of protecting anyone, minor or adult, with whom an unstable person might enter into a potentially dangerous relationship. As with most restrictions on the domestically violent, this would most likely be a temporary ban for a court-determined duration. Opponents contend that there is little to no precedent for such a ban, and that domestic violence does not necessarily correlate with negative behavior in online social networks, but there have been cases where the domestically violent were forbidden from relationships, and so this option is not unthinkable. However, this would most likely be applied on a case-by-case basis than as a general rule. 
..by Sexual Offenders 
Of all the proposals to ensure the safety of social network users by government means, this plan, many would agree, receives the least opposition. It is well-known that those with a history of sexual violence are prone to repeat episodes, and social networking sites provide an easy, free forum for sexual offenders to meet, trail, and target potential victims. Voluntarily, Myspace recently canceled the accounts of thousands of registered sex offenders, indicating that legislation is not necessary for action to be taken on this front. LiveJournal, a web-blog site with social networking capabilities, recently deleted numerous blogs which advocated pedophilia. If if unburdened by any sincere concern for the safety of their members, social networking sites have reason to fear a flurry of bad publicity and public outcry against them if they do not take action against known sexual offenders, both by individuals and by citizen's advocacy groups such as Perverted Justice. However, there is considerable push to forcibly legislate the prohibition of sexual offenders from social networks entirely. Opponents claim that this would not render social networks a "safe place," for first-time offenders would be left unchecked by this policy, but because of the grievous nature of sex crimes, the nature of social network abuse, and the fact that there already exists a system to track and monitor these individuals, it is unlikely to face strong resistance. Recently, Kentucky required sex offenders in its borders to register their electronic communication addresses with the state, specifically for use by social networking sites for cross-checks and account cancellations. Of course, only the most extreme forms of this solution or the coupling of this solution with a form of guaranteed identification would prevent these offenders from registering with aliases, but to most, prohibiting such heinous criminals from using social networks seems like a step in the right direction. Others, however, point to the large degree to which the liberty which former sexual offenders surrender, and wonder whether banning these people from Internet sites is in fact a step toward oppression.

===Limitation of Posted and Available Information by Age===
'''Idea''' 
Given a way to verify the ages of social network subscribers, organizations could limit the nature of the information which younger users could put online, or the nature of the information that they could obtain from other users, thus making their presence on social networking sites less conspicuous to abusers. 
'''Rationale and Arguments'''
This approach addresses two facets of online networks which make victims and abusers prone to interaction. Acknowledging that sexual predators will find ways to use social networks - even in defiance of law and security measures - limiting the amount and type of information placed in social network profiles by age attempts to make younger victims less accessible, perhaps less attractive, and hopefully less vulnerable to sexual predators. For instance, given that people are more likely to be attracted - perversely or not - to people whom they can see, younger users of social networking sites could be prohibited from posting photographs. Given, also, that younger children may not understand what is or is not appropriate online or is or is not likely to attract sexual predators, they could be prohibited from posting blogs in which they may chronicle their days, or their profiles could be scanned algorithmically for personally identifying information, which could be automatically removed. Also, many online services, though no major social networking sites, have parental control settings by which younger users may be forbidden from direct contact with all but a specifically approved whitelist of friends. Thus, younger children would retain the ability to use social networking sites, but several of the factors which may make them likely to be targeted by abusers - visual attractiveness, availability for activities such as stalking, personal identification of or with the victim, and personal contact for developing a relationship with, or "grooming" of, the victim, would be eliminated. As level of site availability would be controlled by age, young users would have the same sort of access as their friends, allowing social networks to continue to be used for many of the same benign purposes as they are today, while hopefully reducing the tendency of their exploitation for illegal activity. 
Opponents of this approach contend that limiting social networking sites' function for younger users may also limit their appeal, and lead to the downfall of this form of communication. Further, they point out that to stratify social network access by age, one must first successfully and accurately identify the ages of the users, which is not currently possible and would ostensibly require a system such as the national identification card suggestion, above, which would have its own set of inherent fixes to the problem of social network abuse. Thus, this approach is often lambasted as being either ineffectual, or, if accommodations are made for its implementation, superfluous. 
===Parental Oversight and Education===
'''Idea''' 
Those intent on the abuse or exploitation of children will always - despite legal requirements or other forms of deterrence - find a way to work towards their perverse goals. Social networking sites are one forum for these attempts at the exploitation of the young. No matter what the government may enact or legislate, responsibility rests with the parents to raise and educate their children in such a way that they are informed, able, and have an active desire to avoid potentially compromising situations online. 
'''Rationale and Arguments''' 
The responsibility to raise, instill values upon, and protect a child ultimately rests with the parents. Social networking sites, and the Internet in general, are a forum about which parents are often ignorant, but in today's world wherein these activities form such significant portions of children's social lives, and wherein such damage can be done to children, many boldly claim that this ignorance is a failure of parenting. Parents need to remain informed about their children's online habits and behavior, and need to instruct their children in what is and is not appropriate online to do online. Parents should instill in their children a desire to behave appropriately, whether on social networking sites or otherwise. Much as children are taught not to accept candy or rides from strangers, parents should issue grave warnings about the dangers of the social networking world. This is not to say that meeting an individual online is inherently bad, but children need to know, and desire to avoid, behaviors which will attract those with impure motives. If parents can raise their children in such a value system that they understand that private information is to be kept private, that the Internet isn't necessarily, but can be dangerous place for too much to be said about oneself, that provocative or sexually suggestive photographs are not something to be appreciated and that their sentiments to something to be emulated, that the provision of hundreds of photos of oneself to the public world is perhaps vanity, and that social networking users carefully judge the character of those with whom they come into contact, there would be little need for government legislation. After all, sexual predators are much less likely to find users who do not offer visual stimulation, often freely given today in the form of entirely inappropriate photographs on public social networking sites of ever-younger children. If a child, further, refuses to communicate with a predator, then no danger exists, even with unrestricted and unlegislated use of social networking sites. If children do not understand or value behavior by which they can protect themselves online, then parents have a duty to protect them, and to raise them in such a way that they will eventually be able to make positive ethical choices for the safe, productive, and fun use of social networks. 
Few reasonable citizens oppose the idea that parents should raise their children with the knowledge and desire to protect themselves online. However, opponents of featuring this approach simply point out that it is not enough, alone, to protect minors on social networking sites. Parents, too often, are uninformed about or uninterested in protecting their children. Others lack the background, knowledge, or desire to raise and care for their children appropriately. Were this not the case, the vast majority of child protection legislation would be unnecessary, and the Departments of Social Services of every state would have no reason to exist. However, merely because one has a child does not mean that one is a good parent, and many point out how relying solely on parents to protect children from the dangers of social networking sites may be entirely unreliable and naive. In short, though it is unfortunate, the truth is that many parents are inept, especially in the realm of technology into which social networking sites fall. While the government cannot legislate the rearing of a child, child protection legislation is routinely needed as a safeguard against the parenting shortcomings of adults.
 
'''Legality'''
The raising of children in a way to make them aware and conscientious of the dangers which social networking sites can potentially pose hardly intersects with the concerns of legality. Legal questions do arise, however, when a parent fails, through a lack of instruction, care, ability, or for some other reason, to protect their child from harm. The degree to which the state should be involved is a hotly debated and deeply personal question, but few disagree that when parents fail, legal measures, whether legislation or litigation, are necessary for the protection of minors.
==Legislation==
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Children%27s_Online_Privacy_Protection_Act Children's Online Privacy Protection Act(1998)] - Requires "verifiable parental consent" for the collection of personal data from children under 13 years of age. 
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deleting_Online_Predators_Act_of_2006 Deleting Online Predators Act(2006)] - Would require schools and libraries receiving federal funding to prohibit the use of chat rooms or very broadly-defined social networking sites for anything but strictly educational use. 
[http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2007_08/sum/sb59.htm Untitled Georgia bill concerning online predators(2007)] - Would require that social networking sites get consent of a minor child's parent before that child could create or maintain a social networking profile, and would require that the parent be given full access to said profile. 
[http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2007&BillID=S+132 North Carolina Protect Children from Sexual Predators Act(2007)]([http://www.wral.com/news/local/politics/video/1644777/ Video]) - Would require parental consent and access for social networking sites of users under 16, and would prohibit convicted sexual offenders from using social networking sites. 
[http://cya.oklibshare.org/blog/house-bill-1715/ Oklahoma HB1715(2007)] - Would require adult supervision for access of the Internet by minor children in libraries, and the blocking of social networking sites on library computers. 
[http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=1682&GAID=9&GA=95&DocTypeID=SB&LegID=29749&SessionID=51 Illinois Social Networking Prohibition Act(2007)] - Would require schools and libraries to block all access to social networking sites. 
[http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/07rs/SB65.htm Kentucky SB65(2007)] - Requires all registered sex offenders to submit their email and instant messaging addresses for cross-referencing with the user rolls of social networking sites.

==Ethical Considerations==

'''Examine the ethical implications of laws that restrict use of social networking services and other internet-based software on the basis of age or criminal record (such as for sex offenders). What are the advantages of these laws and what are the trade-offs for the prospect of increased safety that these laws promise? What are some difficulties in judging the effectiveness of these laws? How does dangerous use of internet social networks by society relate to other dangerous uses of software? When may legislation be appropriate to control use of software by members of society?'''

===Relevant External Links===
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deleting_Online_Predators_Act_of_2006 Wikipedia - Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006]
* [http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-6198595.html ZDNet - MySpace deletes 29,000 sex offenders]
* [http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/ifissues/issuesrelatedlinks/podcastnetworking.htm American Library Association - Online Social Networking and Intellectual Freedom]
* [http://www.safelibraries.org/statecipalaws.htm#cipa_expansion SafeLibraries.org - CIPA 2006 Expansion Effort to Block MySpace, Etc.]
* [http://www.journal-times.com/statenews/local_story_095233745.html Journal-Times - MySpace speaks about KY's new law]
* [http://www.cei.org/gencon/019,05494.cfm Competitive Enterprise Institute - Turning MySpace into TheirSpace]
* [http://www.wral.com/news/local/politics/video/1644777/ WRAL - Headline Saturday: NC Attorney General Targets MySpace.com]
*[http://www.forbes.com/security/2007/01/25/myspace-security-identity-tech-security-cx_ll_0124myspaceage.html Why MySpace doesn't card.]

CSC 379:Week 5, Group 6

2007-08-03T21:28:09Z

Jjpittar:

=Safety and Internet Social Networks=
==Overview==
==Solutions==
===Limit Access in Public Places===
'''Idea''' 
Limit or eliminate the ability of individuals to access social networking sites in public places, such as schools or libraries, as in the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deleting_Online_Predators_Act_of_2006 Deleting Online Predator's Act of 2006] 
'''Rationale and Arguments''' 
Proponents of this approach often cite that while the primary duty to protect and educate children falls with parents, locations such as schools and libraries are places where minors often lack parental supervision, and access to social networking sites should be limited to locations where parents can monitor the activity of their children. Schools and libraries, they further contend, are places of education, and while this approach often allows exemptions for the educational study of social networking, government-maintained computers and public institutions of education are not the appropriate place for online socialization. Also, they note that while the current availability of the Internet in libraries makes the resources of cyberspace available to all, it also provides the the questionable resource of a free, quick, simple, and wide-reaching way for adults to contact minors through social networks. Limitation of social networking sites in the public, it is argued, would at least make such access and contact somewhat more difficult, while leaving the majority of the benefits of the Internet intact.
 
Opponents of this approach question how much it would truly accomplish in keeping so-called "predators" at bay, as well as the true cost for such limited gains. They point out that preventing those who target children from accessing social networking sites in libraries does not prevent them from finding other ways to gain access - at home, work, or with friends. Also, while carefully limiting the behavior of children when outside of parental supervision seems a good idea in principle, a significant problem arises in attempting to legislate precisely what constitutes a "social networking site." While such sites are easily recognizable by those familiar with the technology, the current legislative definition, per the DOPA, would potentially limit access to a number of websites generally agreed to not be of a social networking nature, including Yahoo!, Slashdot, and perhaps, in the future, even Google. The implication of this fact would be to severely mitigate, if not essentially nullify entirely, the value of offering public access to the Internet in libraries at all.
 
'''Legality'''
 
This approach to promoting safety on social networking sites appears to be entirely legal, a point underwritten by the fact that there is presently an act in Congress with the aim of making this particular approach into a federal law. The only presently reasonably foreseeable challenge to the law on Constitutional grounds would be the broad but historically ineffectual assertion that the tenth amendment to the Constitution prohibits federal involvement in schools and libraries.

===Require Age, Consent or Identity Verification via Credit Card===
'''Idea''' 
This approach to ensuring safety on social networking sites would require users to submit credit card information upon signing up for the service. This information would guarantee any of a number of data about a user, such as age, the possession of informed parental consent, or the validity of identity information displayed on the site. Variations on this approach include the use of debit cards or bank accounts in addition to credit cards. 
'''Rationale and Arguments''' 
The idea of requiring users of social networking sites to submit valid information is nothing new. At present, no system exists which compels users to definitively verify much if anything about themselves. Some social networking sites, such as Facebook, have preliminary checks to help ensure that a member really is from a particular area or academic institution, but for the most part these measures are easily circumvented. Proponents of requiring the entry of credit card information to sign up for social networking sites claim that this approach would provide a more effective manner of verifying identity than any measures currently in place, and would not require the establishment of any new identification system. Presentation of credit card information, they argue, would require that adults use their true names and ages when signing up for the site, and that minors have true parental consent, in order to create a social networking profile. Thus, parents would be kept more informed about their children's online behavior, and online predators would be easier to identify and monitor, screen, or eliminate from the service, as they would not be able to hide behind aliases. Additionally, potential first-time offenders would not be able to mislead minors about their identities, as names and ages of cardholders would be verifiable. 

Opponents of this approach, however, adamantly insist that it would do more harm than good. As with all legislative approaches, the problem exists of legally defining precisely what constitutes a social networking site. Perhaps more importantly, current wide definitions of social networks would require a user to submit credit card information to a wealth of websites, putting him or her at risk for unauthorized transactions by unscrupulous employees or hackers, and perhaps even identity theft. Companies would also have to shoulder the burden of storing and securing databases of very sensitive information, and would most likely be liable for breaches. Further, this approach would unfairly exclude from social networks all adults who had no credit card or bank account, and all children of such adults, as well. While adults who signed up for social networking services would in theory have their identities verified, many point out that children, especially teens, are fully (if not legitimately) capable of obtaining a parent's credit card information either without informing the parent of the purpose, or entirely without consent. While this fault does ultimately reside with the parent, it nonetheless poses a significant challenge to those who claim that parental oversight of social networking activity would be achieved by means of credit card entry. 
'''Legality''' 
Though perhaps unwise, this policy does seem to be legal. Any institution can require the submission of credit information, if by no other means than simply charging a trivial fee for its services.

===Require Age, Consent, or Identity Verification via National Identification===
'''Idea''' 
This approach would require the establishment of a national identification card program to cover United States citizens. Potential members of social networking sites would submit their identification number and confirming password or PIN, and identity information on the site would correspond to the information in a national database associated with that individual. In the event that a minor signed up for such a site, consent would ideally be obtained directly from the parent or guardian directly from the social networking organization. 
'''Rationale and Arguments'''
 
Arguments both for and against establishing identity through a national identification system largely parallel their counterparts for and against establishing identity by means of credit card information. Proponents of this approach specifically indicate that four distinct advantages present themselves in the national identification scheme over the credit card scheme. Firstly, if all individuals were to have an identification card, then it would not be difficult for those without credit cards or bank accounts, or their children, to use social networking sites. Further, the information presented by minors to such sites would be accurate - something that cannot be guaranteed by the credit card system, as minors are not cardholders. Parental consent would also be less subject to circumvention, as children would be ostensibly less likely to give fraudulent consent when the parent was contacted directly - perhaps by phone, postal mail, or email - rather than when mere possession of a credit card. Finally, the risk of the theft of credit information would not be present in a system which did not retain that information at all.
 
Opponents, however, see more danger in the proposal of a national identity program alone, notwithstanding its use for social networking sites, than in the idea of using credit information to verify social networking information. National identification at all, they argue, would be a dangerous step in the direction of tighter government monitoring of American citizens, and would eventually mean the renunciation of further precepts of privacy, whether they be rights or privileges. Additionally, a centralized federal database of identity information, as well as the association of this information with numerous social networking accounts, would place users at perhaps an even greater risk for identity theft than any other safety scheme herein discussed. The registration of minors in particular poses an entirely different set of concerns, largely unrelated to this topic. It would be likely, as well, that any national identification program would be used, as social security numbers are now, for a number of different purposes relating to private information, meaning that a failure in the security of a social networking site could lead to a host of other problems for the site's users. Possession of parental consent by minors, while more likely than in the credit card scheme, would neither be guaranteed by these means. Undoubtedly, however, the most daunting problem with this idea is the establishment of a national identity program itself, which would most likely have to be government-mandated in order to ensure accuracy. Finally, it is doubtful that this would provide a complete fix to the problem, as most social networking sites are open to locations outside of the United States, which would be unaffected by any identity confirmation requirements in this nation, as when a teen from Michigan traveled to the nation of Jordan to meet someone with whom she was acquainted on a social network.
 
'''Legality''' 
While no specific legislation exists to prohibit this particular approach, previous attempts to begin a national identification card program has met with significant opposition, both from private organizations and from the states, and would probably be challenged in the courts if enacted.
===Restricting or Prohibiting Access...===
'''Overview of Idea''' 
The central idea for forcibly protecting the safety of minors on social networking sites is to limit access to such sites by those considered most likely to become potential victims, or those most likely to become potential abusers, or both. While this eliminates the risk of potentially unsafe incidents between these two groups, it raises serious questions, as well. Of course, moreover, the ability to block a specific portion of the population from social networking sites also requires that their computer usage be tracked and monitored, an idea alone with which many people take issue. Either a suspiciously Orwellian technological solution or vast armies of parole officers would be necessary for a number of the suggestions below.

...by Age 
Due to the Children's Online Privacy and Protection Act, children under the age of 13 cannot sign up for memberships to any website without "verifiable" parental consent. Myspace, one of the major online social networking sites, requires its users to be at least 14 years of age, or rather, to report that they are at least 14 years of age, to register for an account. However, many wonder if this age limit is too low - whether 14-year-olds can fully grasp the possible repercussions of exposing personal data - everything from one's likes and dislikes, to a list of friends, to potentially exploitable photographs - online. There have been suggestions to raise this limit to anywhere between sixteen and eighteen. While this change would manifest a significant negative impact on the business and user base of several social networking sites, it would certainly put younger children out of harm's way. More importantly, however, is the statement that imposing this limit by means of legislation would make about children's rights, and the right of parents to govern their child's behavior as they see fit. Children's rights, relative to adults, are curtailed, to be sure. How many activities, however, purely innocent and recreational if not for the few who exploit the system, must the government legislate away in the name of safety? Do they truly have the right to do so? On the other hand, if it prevents abductions or abuse, does the question of authority really matter? More immediately, however, is the question of how, without a national ID card program, children who desire to use social networks can be expected to report their actual ages.
 
...by Felons 
By law, individuals who commit a felony already forfeit a number of their rights as United States citizens, such as the right to vote or to hold certain political offices. It has been suggested that future social networking legislation also force felons to forfeit the right to create or use a social networking account. Essentially, the thinking behind this approach reasons that commission of a felony may be a "risk factor" for exploitation of children online - that felons are more likely than law-abiding citizens to be or to become online predators. Unfortunately, this is largely unsubstantiated, especially for those whose infractions have no relation to child exploitation or cyber-crime. Opponents argue that the punishment of prohibition of online social networking does not universally fit felony crimes. Thus, this policy might be challenged as "unusual" punishment on a Constitutional basis. 
...by the Mentally Ill 
Much as with the commission of a felony, some believe there to be a correlation between severe mental illness and the tendency to exploit or abuse minors. In fact, it has been argued that the desire to sexually abuse children in and of itself constitutes a mental illness. In many states, those who have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution, and thus judged to be a danger to themselves or others, are prohibited from owning a firearm. The idea has been brought forth that these people, having already been judged by professionals to be a danger in some capacity, be barred from social networking sites, as they there could pose a new sort of danger to the site's members. This is somewhat more accepted than the idea of banning all felons, as mental illness more closely relates to sociopathic or unpredictable behavior than does the commission of most crimes, but some still see it as the repression of a group whose members need more help than regulation. 
...by the Domestically Violent 
Prohibition of the domestically violent from using social networking sites has been suggested, not so much as a means of protecting the young, but of protecting anyone, minor or adult, with whom an unstable person might enter into a potentially dangerous relationship. As with most restrictions on the domestically violent, this would most likely be a temporary ban for a court-determined duration. Opponents contend that there is little to no precedent for such a ban, and that domestic violence does not necessarily correlate with negative behavior in online social networks, but there have been cases where the domestically violent were forbidden from relationships, and so this option is not unthinkable. However, this would most likely be applied on a case-by-case basis than as a general rule. 
..by Sexual Offenders 
Of all the proposals to ensure the safety of social network users by government means, this plan, many would agree, receives the least opposition. It is well-known that those with a history of sexual violence are prone to repeat episodes, and social networking sites provide an easy, free forum for sexual offenders to meet, trail, and target potential victims. Voluntarily, Myspace recently canceled the accounts of thousands of registered sex offenders, indicating that legislation is not necessary for action to be taken on this front. LiveJournal, a web-blog site with social networking capabilities, recently deleted numerous blogs which advocated pedophilia. If if unburdened by any sincere concern for the safety of their members, social networking sites have reason to fear a flurry of bad publicity and public outcry against them if they do not take action against known sexual offenders, both by individuals and by citizen's advocacy groups such as Perverted Justice. However, there is considerable push to forcibly legislate the prohibition of sexual offenders from social networks entirely. Opponents claim that this would not render social networks a "safe place," for first-time offenders would be left unchecked by this policy, but because of the grievous nature of sex crimes, the nature of social network abuse, and the fact that there already exists a system to track and monitor these individuals, it is unlikely to face strong resistance. Recently, Kentucky required sex offenders in its borders to register their electronic communication addresses with the state, specifically for use by social networking sites for cross-checks and account cancellations. Of course, only the most extreme forms of this solution or the coupling of this solution with a form of guaranteed identification would prevent these offenders from registering with aliases, but to most, prohibiting such heinous criminals from using social networks seems like a step in the right direction. Others, however, point to the large degree to which the liberty which former sexual offenders surrender, and wonder whether banning these people from Internet sites is in fact a step toward oppression.

===Limitation of Posted and Available Information by Age===
'''Idea''' 
Given a way to verify the ages of social network subscribers, organizations could limit the nature of the information which younger users could put online, or the nature of the information that they could obtain from other users, thus making their presence on social networking sites less conspicuous to abusers. 
'''Rationale and Arguments'''
This approach addresses two facets of online networks which make victims and abusers prone to interaction. Acknowledging that sexual predators will find ways to use social networks - even in defiance of law and security measures - limiting the amount and type of information placed in social network profiles by age attempts to make younger victims less accessible, perhaps less attractive, and hopefully less vulnerable to sexual predators. For instance, given that people are more likely to be attracted - perversely or not - to people whom they can see, younger users of social networking sites could be prohibited from posting photographs. Given, also, that younger children may not understand what is or is not appropriate online or is or is not likely to attract sexual predators, they could be prohibited from posting blogs in which they may chronicle their days, or their profiles could be scanned algorithmically for personally identifying information, which could be automatically removed. Also, many online services, though no major social networking sites, have parental control settings by which younger users may be forbidden from direct contact with all but a specifically approved whitelist of friends. Thus, younger children would retain the ability to use social networking sites, but several of the factors which may make them likely to be targeted by abusers - visual attractiveness, availability for activities such as stalking, personal identification of or with the victim, and personal contact for developing a relationship with, or "grooming" of, the victim, would be eliminated. As level of site availability would be controlled by age, young users would have the same sort of access as their friends, allowing social networks to continue to be used for many of the same benign purposes as they are today, while hopefully reducing the tendency of their exploitation for illegal activity. 
Opponents of this approach contend that limiting social networking sites' function for younger users may also limit their appeal, and lead to the downfall of this form of communication. Further, they point out that to stratify social network access by age, one must first successfully and accurately identify the ages of the users, which is not currently possible and would ostensibly require a system such as the national identification card suggestion, above, which would have its own set of inherent fixes to the problem of social network abuse. Thus, this approach is often lambasted as being either ineffectual, or, if accommodations are made for its implementation, superfluous. 
===Parental Oversight and Education===
'''Idea''' 
Those intent on the abuse or exploitation of children will always - despite legal requirements or other forms of deterrence - find a way to work towards their perverse goals. Social networking sites are one forum for these attempts at the exploitation of the young. No matter what the government may enact or legislate, responsibility rests with the parents to raise and educate their children in such a way that they are informed, able, and have an active desire to avoid potentially compromising situations online. 
'''Rationale and Arguments''' 
The responsibility to raise, instill values upon, and protect a child ultimately rests with the parents. Social networking sites, and the Internet in general, are a forum about which parents are often ignorant, but in today's world wherein these activities form such significant portions of children's social lives, and wherein such damage can be done to children, many boldly claim that this ignorance is a failure of parenting. Parents need to remain informed about their children's online habits and behavior, and need to instruct their children in what is and is not appropriate online to do online. Parents should instill in their children a desire to behave appropriately, whether on social networking sites or otherwise. Much as children are taught not to accept candy or rides from strangers, parents should issue grave warnings about the dangers of the social networking world. This is not to say that meeting an individual online is inherently bad, but children need to know, and desire to avoid, behaviors which will attract those with impure motives. If parents can raise their children in such a value system that they understand that private information is to be kept private, that the Internet isn't necessarily, but can be dangerous place for too much to be said about oneself, that provocative or sexually suggestive photographs are not something to be appreciated and that their sentiments to something to be emulated, that the provision of hundreds of photos of oneself to the public world is perhaps vanity, and that social networking users carefully judge the character of those with whom they come into contact, there would be little need for government legislation. After all, sexual predators are much less likely to find users who do not offer visual stimulation, often freely given today in the form of entirely inappropriate photographs on public social networking sites of ever-younger children. If a child, further, refuses to communicate with a predator, then no danger exists, even with unrestricted and unlegislated use of social networking sites. If children do not understand or value behavior by which they can protect themselves online, then parents have a duty to protect them, and to raise them in such a way that they will eventually be able to make positive ethical choices for the safe, productive, and fun use of social networks. 
Few reasonable citizens oppose the idea that parents should raise their children with the knowledge and desire to protect themselves online. However, opponents of featuring this approach simply point out that it is not enough, alone, to protect minors on social networking sites. Parents, too often, are uninformed about or uninterested in protecting their children. Others lack the background, knowledge, or desire to raise and care for their children appropriately. Were this not the case, the vast majority of child protection legislation would be unnecessary, and the Departments of Social Services of every state would have no reason to exist. However, merely because one has a child does not mean that one is a good parent, and many point out how relying solely on parents to protect children from the dangers of social networking sites may be entirely unreliable and naive. In short, though it is unfortunate, the truth is that many parents are inept, especially in the realm of technology into which social networking sites fall. While the government cannot legislate the rearing of a child, child protection legislation is routinely needed as a safeguard against the parenting shortcomings of adults.
 
'''Legality'''
The raising of children in a way to make them aware and conscientious of the dangers which social networking sites can potentially pose hardly intersects with the concerns of legality. Legal questions do arise, however, when a parent fails, through a lack of instruction, care, ability, or for some other reason, to protect their child from harm. The degree to which the state should be involved is a hotly debated and deeply personal question, but few disagree that when parents fail, legal measures, whether legislation or litigation, are necessary for the protection of minors.
==Legislation==
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Children%27s_Online_Privacy_Protection_Act Children's Online Privacy Protection Act(1998)] - Requires "verifiable parental consent" for the collection of personal data from children under 13 years of age. 
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deleting_Online_Predators_Act_of_2006 Deleting Online Predators Act(2006)] - Would require schools and libraries receiving federal funding to prohibit the use of chat rooms or very broadly-defined social networking sites for anything but strictly educational use. 
[http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2007_08/sum/sb59.htm Untitled Georgia bill concerning online predators(2007)] - Would require that social networking sites get consent of a minor child's parent before that child could create or maintain a social networking profile, and would require that the parent be given full access to said profile. 
[http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2007&BillID=S+132 North Carolina Protect Children from Sexual Predators Act(2007)]([http://www.wral.com/news/local/politics/video/1644777/ Video]) - Would require parental consent and access for social networking sites of users under 16, and would prohibit convicted sexual offenders from using social networking sites.
[http://cya.oklibshare.org/blog/house-bill-1715/ Oklahoma HB1715(2007)] - Would require adult supervision for access of the Internet by minor children in libraries, and the blocking of social networking sites on library computers.
[http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=1682&GAID=9&GA=95&DocTypeID=SB&LegID=29749&SessionID=51 Illinois Social Networking Prohibition Act(2007)] - Would require schools and libraries to block all access to social networking sites.
[http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/07rs/SB65.htm Kentucky SB65(2007)] - Requires all registered sex offenders to submit their email and instant messaging addresses for cross-referencing with the user rolls of social networking sites.

==Ethical Considerations==

'''Examine the ethical implications of laws that restrict use of social networking services and other internet-based software on the basis of age or criminal record (such as for sex offenders). What are the advantages of these laws and what are the trade-offs for the prospect of increased safety that these laws promise? What are some difficulties in judging the effectiveness of these laws? How does dangerous use of internet social networks by society relate to other dangerous uses of software? When may legislation be appropriate to control use of software by members of society?'''

===Relevant External Links===
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deleting_Online_Predators_Act_of_2006 Wikipedia - Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006]
* [http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-6198595.html ZDNet - MySpace deletes 29,000 sex offenders]
* [http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/ifissues/issuesrelatedlinks/podcastnetworking.htm American Library Association - Online Social Networking and Intellectual Freedom]
* [http://www.safelibraries.org/statecipalaws.htm#cipa_expansion SafeLibraries.org - CIPA 2006 Expansion Effort to Block MySpace, Etc.]
* [http://www.journal-times.com/statenews/local_story_095233745.html Journal-Times - MySpace speaks about KY's new law]
* [http://www.cei.org/gencon/019,05494.cfm Competitive Enterprise Institute - Turning MySpace into TheirSpace]
* [http://www.wral.com/news/local/politics/video/1644777/ WRAL - Headline Saturday: NC Attorney General Targets MySpace.com]

CSC 379:Week 5, Group 6

2007-08-03T20:38:42Z

Jjpittar:

=Safety and Internet Social Networks=
==Overview==
==Solutions==
===Limit Access in Public Places===
'''Idea''' 
Limit or eliminate the ability of individuals to access social networking sites in public places, such as schools or libraries, as in the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deleting_Online_Predators_Act_of_2006 Deleting Online Predator's Act of 2006] 
'''Rationale and Arguments''' 
Proponents of this approach often cite that while the primary duty to protect and educate children falls with parents, locations such as schools and libraries are places where minors often lack parental supervision, and access to social networking sites should be limited to locations where parents can monitor the activity of their children. Schools and libraries, they further contend, are places of education, and while this approach often allows exemptions for the educational study of social networking, government-maintained computers and public institutions of education are not the appropriate place for online socialization. Also, they note that while the current availability of the Internet in libraries makes the resources of cyberspace available to all, it also provides the the questionable resource of a free, quick, simple, and wide-reaching way for adults to contact minors through social networks. Limitation of social networking sites in the public, it is argued, would at least make such access and contact somewhat more difficult, while leaving the majority of the benefits of the Internet intact.
 
Opponents of this approach question how much it would truly accomplish in keeping so-called "predators" at bay, as well as the true cost for such limited gains. They point out that preventing those who target children from accessing social networking sites in libraries does not prevent them from finding other ways to gain access - at home, work, or with friends. Also, while carefully limiting the behavior of children when outside of parental supervision seems a good idea in principle, a significant problem arises in attempting to legislate precisely what constitutes a "social networking site." While such sites are easily recognizable by those familiar with the technology, the current legislative definition, per the DOPA, would potentially limit access to a number of websites generally agreed to not be of a social networking nature, including Yahoo!, Slashdot, and perhaps, in the future, even Google. The implication of this fact would be to severely mitigate, if not essentially nullify entirely, the value of offering public access to the Internet in libraries at all.
 
'''Legality'''
 
This approach to promoting safety on social networking sites appears to be entirely legal, a point underwritten by the fact that there is presently an act in Congress with the aim of making this particular approach into a federal law. The only presently reasonably foreseeable challenge to the law on Constitutional grounds would be the broad but historically ineffectual assertion that the tenth amendment to the Constitution prohibits federal involvement in schools and libraries.

===Require Age, Consent or Identity Verification via Credit Card===
'''Idea''' 
This approach to ensuring safety on social networking sites would require users to submit credit card information upon signing up for the service. This information would guarantee any of a number of data about a user, such as age, the possession of informed parental consent, or the validity of identity information displayed on the site. Variations on this approach include the use of debit cards or bank accounts in addition to credit cards. 
'''Rationale and Arguments''' 
The idea of requiring users of social networking sites to submit valid information is nothing new. At present, no system exists which compels users to definitively verify much if anything about themselves. Some social networking sites, such as Facebook, have preliminary checks to help ensure that a member really is from a particular area or academic institution, but for the most part these measures are easily circumvented. Proponents of requiring the entry of credit card information to sign up for social networking sites claim that this approach would provide a more effective manner of verifying identity than any measures currently in place, and would not require the establishment of any new identification system. Presentation of credit card information, they argue, would require that adults use their true names and ages when signing up for the site, and that minors have true parental consent, in order to create a social networking profile. Thus, parents would be kept more informed about their children's online behavior, and online predators would be easier to identify and monitor, screen, or eliminate from the service, as they would not be able to hide behind aliases. Additionally, potential first-time offenders would not be able to mislead minors about their identities, as names and ages of cardholders would be verifiable. 

Opponents of this approach, however, adamantly insist that it would do more harm than good. As with all legislative approaches, the problem exists of legally defining precisely what constitutes a social networking site. Perhaps more importantly, current wide definitions of social networks would require a user to submit credit card information to a wealth of websites, putting him or her at risk for unauthorized transactions by unscrupulous employees or hackers, and perhaps even identity theft. Companies would also have to shoulder the burden of storing and securing databases of very sensitive information, and would most likely be liable for breaches. Further, this approach would unfairly exclude from social networks all adults who had no credit card or bank account, and all children of such adults, as well. While adults who signed up for social networking services would in theory have their identities verified, many point out that children, especially teens, are fully (if not legitimately) capable of obtaining a parent's credit card information either without informing the parent of the purpose, or entirely without consent. While this fault does ultimately reside with the parent, it nonetheless poses a significant challenge to those who claim that parental oversight of social networking activity would be achieved by means of credit card entry. 
'''Legality''' 
Though perhaps unwise, this policy does seem to be legal. Any institution can require the submission of credit information, if by no other means than simply charging a trivial fee for its services.

===Require Age, Consent, or Identity Verification via National Identification===
'''Idea''' 
This approach would require the establishment of a national identification card program to cover United States citizens. Potential members of social networking sites would submit their identification number and confirming password or PIN, and identity information on the site would correspond to the information in a national database associated with that individual. In the event that a minor signed up for such a site, consent would ideally be obtained directly from the parent or guardian directly from the social networking organization. 
'''Rationale and Arguments'''
 
Arguments both for and against establishing identity through a national identification system largely parallel their counterparts for and against establishing identity by means of credit card information. Proponents of this approach specifically indicate that four distinct advantages present themselves in the national identification scheme over the credit card scheme. Firstly, if all individuals were to have an identification card, then it would not be difficult for those without credit cards or bank accounts, or their children, to use social networking sites. Further, the information presented by minors to such sites would be accurate - something that cannot be guaranteed by the credit card system, as minors are not cardholders. Parental consent would also be less subject to circumvention, as children would be ostensibly less likely to give fraudulent consent when the parent was contacted directly - perhaps by phone, postal mail, or email - rather than when mere possession of a credit card. Finally, the risk of the theft of credit information would not be present in a system which did not retain that information at all.
 
Opponents, however, see more danger in the proposal of a national identity program alone, notwithstanding its use for social networking sites, than in the idea of using credit information to verify social networking information. National identification at all, they argue, would be a dangerous step in the direction of tighter government monitoring of American citizens, and would eventually mean the renunciation of further precepts of privacy, whether they be rights or privileges. Additionally, a centralized federal database of identity information, as well as the association of this information with numerous social networking accounts, would place users at perhaps an even greater risk for identity theft than any other safety scheme herein discussed. The registration of minors in particular poses an entirely different set of concerns, largely unrelated to this topic. It would be likely, as well, that any national identification program would be used, as social security numbers are now, for a number of different purposes relating to private information, meaning that a failure in the security of a social networking site could lead to a host of other problems for the site's users. Possession of parental consent by minors, while more likely than in the credit card scheme, would neither be guaranteed by these means. Undoubtedly, however, the most daunting problem with this idea is the establishment of a national identity program itself, which would most likely have to be government-mandated in order to ensure accuracy. Finally, it is doubtful that this would provide a complete fix to the problem, as most social networking sites are open to locations outside of the United States, which would be unaffected by any identity confirmation requirements in this nation, as when a teen from Michigan traveled to the nation of Jordan to meet someone with whom she was acquainted on a social network.
 
'''Legality''' 
While no specific legislation exists to prohibit this particular approach, previous attempts to begin a national identification card program has met with significant opposition, both from private organizations and from the states, and would probably be challenged in the courts if enacted.
===Restricting or Prohibiting Access...===
'''Overview of Idea''' 
The central idea for forcibly protecting the safety of minors on social networking sites is to limit access to such sites by those considered most likely to become potential victims, or those most likely to become potential abusers, or both. While this eliminates the risk of potentially unsafe incidents between these two groups, it raises serious questions, as well. Of course, moreover, the ability to block a specific portion of the population from social networking sites also requires that their computer usage be tracked and monitored, an idea alone with which many people take issue. Either a suspiciously Orwellian technological solution or vast armies of parole officers would be necessary for a number of the suggestions below.

...by Age 
Due to the Children's Online Privacy and Protection Act, children under the age of 13 cannot sign up for memberships to any website without "verifiable" parental consent. Myspace, one of the major online social networking sites, requires its users to be at least 14 years of age, or rather, to report that they are at least 14 years of age, to register for an account. However, many wonder if this age limit is too low - whether 14-year-olds can fully grasp the possible repercussions of exposing personal data - everything from one's likes and dislikes, to a list of friends, to potentially exploitable photographs - online. There have been suggestions to raise this limit to anywhere between sixteen and eighteen. While this change would manifest a significant negative impact on the business and user base of several social networking sites, it would certainly put younger children out of harm's way. More importantly, however, is the statement that imposing this limit by means of legislation would make about children's rights, and the right of parents to govern their child's behavior as they see fit. Children's rights, relative to adults, are curtailed, to be sure. How many activities, however, purely innocent and recreational if not for the few who exploit the system, must the government legislate away in the name of safety? Do they truly have the right to do so? On the other hand, if it prevents abductions or abuse, does the question of authority really matter? More immediately, however, is the question of how, without a national ID card program, children who desire to use social networks can be expected to report their actual ages.
 
...by Felons 
By law, individuals who commit a felony already forfeit a number of their rights as United States citizens, such as the right to vote or to hold certain political offices. It has been suggested that future social networking legislation also force felons to forfeit the right to create or use a social networking account. Essentially, the thinking behind this approach reasons that commission of a felony may be a "risk factor" for exploitation of children online - that felons are more likely than law-abiding citizens to be or to become online predators. Unfortunately, this is largely unsubstantiated, especially for those whose infractions have no relation to child exploitation or cyber-crime. Opponents argue that the punishment of prohibition of online social networking does not universally fit felony crimes. Thus, this policy might be challenged as "unusual" punishment on a Constitutional basis. 
...by the Mentally Ill 
Much as with the commission of a felony, some believe there to be a correlation between severe mental illness and the tendency to exploit or abuse minors. In fact, it has been argued that the desire to sexually abuse children in and of itself constitutes a mental illness. In many states, those who have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution, and thus judged to be a danger to themselves or others, are prohibited from owning a firearm. The idea has been brought forth that these people, having already been judged by professionals to be a danger in some capacity, be barred from social networking sites, as they there could pose a new sort of danger to the site's members. This is somewhat more accepted than the idea of banning all felons, as mental illness more closely relates to sociopathic or unpredictable behavior than does the commission of most crimes, but some still see it as the repression of a group whose members need more help than regulation. 
...by the Domestically Violent 
Prohibition of the domestically violent from using social networking sites has been suggested, not so much as a means of protecting the young, but of protecting anyone, minor or adult, with whom an unstable person might enter into a potentially dangerous relationship. As with most restrictions on the domestically violent, this would most likely be a temporary ban for a court-determined duration. Opponents contend that there is little to no precedent for such a ban, and that domestic violence does not necessarily correlate with negative behavior in online social networks, but there have been cases where the domestically violent were forbidden from relationships, and so this option is not unthinkable. However, this would most likely be applied on a case-by-case basis than as a general rule. 
..by Sexual Offenders 
Of all the proposals to ensure the safety of social network users by government means, this plan, many would agree, receives the least opposition. It is well-known that those with a history of sexual violence are prone to repeat episodes, and social networking sites provide an easy, free forum for sexual offenders to meet, trail, and target potential victims. Voluntarily, Myspace recently canceled the accounts of thousands of registered sex offenders, indicating that legislation is not necessary for action to be taken on this front. LiveJournal, a web-blog site with social networking capabilities, recently deleted numerous blogs which advocated pedophilia. If if unburdened by any sincere concern for the safety of their members, social networking sites have reason to fear a flurry of bad publicity and public outcry against them if they do not take action against known sexual offenders, both by individuals and by citizen's advocacy groups such as Perverted Justice. However, there is considerable push to forcibly legislate the prohibition of sexual offenders from social networks entirely. Opponents claim that this would not render social networks a "safe place," for first-time offenders would be left unchecked by this policy, but because of the grievous nature of sex crimes, the nature of social network abuse, and the fact that there already exists a system to track and monitor these individuals, it is unlikely to face strong resistance. Recently, Kentucky required sex offenders in its borders to register their electronic communication addresses with the state, specifically for use by social networking sites for cross-checks and account cancellations. Of course, only the most extreme forms of this solution or the coupling of this solution with a form of guaranteed identification would prevent these offenders from registering with aliases, but to most, prohibiting such heinous criminals from using social networks seems like a step in the right direction. Others, however, point to the large degree to which the liberty which former sexual offenders surrender, and wonder whether banning these people from Internet sites is in fact a step toward oppression.

===Limitation of Posted and Available Information by Age===
'''Idea''' 
Given a way to verify the ages of social network subscribers, organizations could limit the nature of the information which younger users could put online, or the nature of the information that they could obtain from other users, thus making their presence on social networking sites less conspicuous to abusers. 
'''Rationale and Arguments'''
This approach addresses two facets of online networks which make victims and abusers prone to interaction. Acknowledging that sexual predators will find ways to use social networks - even in defiance of law and security measures - limiting the amount and type of information placed in social network profiles by age attempts to make younger victims less accessible, perhaps less attractive, and hopefully less vulnerable to sexual predators. For instance, given that people are more likely to be attracted - perversely or not - to people whom they can see, younger users of social networking sites could be prohibited from posting photographs. Given, also, that younger children may not understand what is or is not appropriate online or is or is not likely to attract sexual predators, they could be prohibited from posting blogs in which they may chronicle their days, or their profiles could be scanned algorithmically for personally identifying information, which could be automatically removed. Also, many online services, though no major social networking sites, have parental control settings by which younger users may be forbidden from direct contact with all but a specifically approved whitelist of friends. Thus, younger children would retain the ability to use social networking sites, but several of the factors which may make them likely to be targeted by abusers - visual attractiveness, availability for activities such as stalking, personal identification of or with the victim, and personal contact for developing a relationship with, or "grooming" of, the victim, would be eliminated. As level of site availability would be controlled by age, young users would have the same sort of access as their friends, allowing social networks to continue to be used for many of the same benign purposes as they are today, while hopefully reducing the tendency of their exploitation for illegal activity. 
Opponents of this approach contend that limiting social networking sites' function for younger users may also limit their appeal, and lead to the downfall of this form of communication. Further, they point out that to stratify social network access by age, one must first successfully and accurately identify the ages of the users, which is not currently possible and would ostensibly require a system such as the national identification card suggestion, above, which would have its own set of inherent fixes to the problem of social network abuse. Thus, this approach is often lambasted as being either ineffectual, or, if accommodations are made for its implementation, superfluous. 
===Parental Oversight and Education===
'''Idea'''
Those intent on the abuse or exploitation of children will always - despite legal requirements or other forms of deterrence - find a way to work towards their perverse goals. Social networking sites are one forum for these attempts at the exploitation of the young. No matter what the government may enact or legislate, responsibility rests with the parents to raise and educate their children in such a way that they are informed, able, and have an active desire to avoid potentially compromising situations online.
'''Rationale and Arguments'''
The responsibility to raise, instill values upon, and protect a child ultimately rests with the parents. Social networking sites, and the Internet in general, are a forum about which parents are often ignorant, but in today's world wherein these activities form such significant portions of children's social lives, and wherein such damage can be done to children, many boldly claim that this ignorance is a failure of parenting. Parents need to remain informed about their children's online habits and behavior, and need to instruct their children in what is and is not appropriate online to do online. Parents should instill in their children a desire to behave appropriately, whether on social networking sites or otherwise. Much as children are taught not to accept candy or rides from strangers, parents should issue grave warnings about the dangers of the social networking world. This is not to say that meeting an individual online is inherently bad, but children need to know, and desire to avoid, behaviors which will attract those with impure motives. If parents can raise their children in such a value system that they understand that private information is to be kept private, that the Internet isn't necessarily, but can be dangerous place for too much to be said about oneself, that provocative or sexually suggestive photographs are not something to be appreciated and that their sentiments to something to be emulated, that the provision of hundreds of photos of oneself to the public world is perhaps vanity, and that social networking users carefully judge the character of those with whom they come into contact, there would be little need for government legislation. After all, sexual predators are much less likely to find users who do not offer visual stimulation, often freely given today in the form of entirely inappropriate photographs on public social networking sites of ever-younger children. If a child, further, refuses to communicate with a predator, then no danger exists, even with unrestricted and unlegislated use of social networking sites. If children do not understand or value behavior by which they can protect themselves online, then parents have a duty to protect them, and to raise them in such a way that they will eventually be able to make positive ethical choices for the safe, productive, and fun use of social networks. 
Few reasonable citizens oppose the idea that parents should raise their children with the knowledge and desire to protect themselves online. However, opponents of featuring this approach simply point out that it is not enough, alone, to protect minors on social networking sites. Parents, too often, are uninformed about or uninterested in protecting their children. Others lack the background, knowledge, or desire to raise and care for their children appropriately. Were this not the case, the vast majority of child protection legislation would be unnecessary, and the Departments of Social Services of every state would have no reason to exist. However, merely because one has a child does not mean that one is a good parent, and many point out how relying solely on parents to protect children from the dangers of social networking sites may be entirely unreliable and naive. In short, though it is unfortunate, the truth is that many parents are inept, especially in the realm of technology into which social networking sites fall. While the government cannot legislate the rearing of a child, child protection legislation is routinely needed as a safeguard against the parenting shortcomings of adults.
==Legislation==
DOPA
COPPA

==Ethical Considerations==

'''Examine the ethical implications of laws that restrict use of social networking services and other internet-based software on the basis of age or criminal record (such as for sex offenders). What are the advantages of these laws and what are the trade-offs for the prospect of increased safety that these laws promise? What are some difficulties in judging the effectiveness of these laws? How does dangerous use of internet social networks by society relate to other dangerous uses of software? When may legislation be appropriate to control use of software by members of society?'''

===Relevant External Links===
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deleting_Online_Predators_Act_of_2006 Wikipedia - Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006]
* [http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-6198595.html ZDNet - MySpace deletes 29,000 sex offenders]
* [http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/ifissues/issuesrelatedlinks/podcastnetworking.htm American Library Association - Online Social Networking and Intellectual Freedom]
* [http://www.safelibraries.org/statecipalaws.htm#cipa_expansion SafeLibraries.org - CIPA 2006 Expansion Effort to Block MySpace, Etc.]
* [http://www.journal-times.com/statenews/local_story_095233745.html Journal-Times - MySpace speaks about KY's new law]
* [http://www.cei.org/gencon/019,05494.cfm Competitive Enterprise Institute - Turning MySpace into TheirSpace]
* [http://www.wral.com/news/local/politics/video/1644777/ WRAL - Headline Saturday: NC Attorney General Targets MySpace.com]

CSC 379:Week 5, Group 6

2007-08-03T19:34:57Z

Jjpittar:

CSC 379:Week 5, Group 6

2007-08-03T17:55:39Z

Jjpittar:

CSC 379:Week 5, Group 6

2007-08-03T16:28:56Z

Jjpittar:

CSC 379:Week 5, Group 6

2007-08-03T15:56:35Z

Jjpittar:

CSC 379:Week 4, Group 1

2007-07-29T00:26:48Z

Jjpittar:

=Internet Surveillance (e.g. AT&T’s NSA Rooms)=
==The issues concerning internet surveillance==
Most of us are aware of government surveillance as it pertains to wiretapping to listen in on phone conversations. This type of government surveillance has had many laws developed around it and how and when it may be done. With the growth of internet traffic, similar surveillance has appeared in the realms of email, voice over IP (VOIP), and general internet traffic. The same problems that occurred years ago for the telephone communications networks have been approached for internet communications.

The first issue that surrounds internet surveillance is how to make it possible. In order to conform to Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), phone networks had to be designed so that wiretapping was an easy thing to do if an appropriate government organization requested it. However, much internet traffic is optical instead of electrical. When electricity travels through a wire, it emits a small magnetic field. Something very close to the wire could intercept the electrical communication without affecting it. Optical communication doesn't "leak" any of the light, so the communication has to be disturbed in order to intercept it. This is usually done with a splitter which diverts a percentage of the light down another path.

The second issue is authority. Mainly, who decides whether and how much internet surveillance can take place. Should there be a different authority or amount of evidence in order to intercept foreign communications as opposed to domestic? Does the person whose information is being gathered have to be notified? Does the court have to issue a warrant for a government agency to investigate internet traffic? If so, how much information can be gathered without a warrant?

'''Links'''
* [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Internet_surveillance Basics of internet surveillance]
* [http://www.securityfocus.com/news/8394 Conforming to CALEA]

==Ethical issues with CALEA==
Making it possible to intercept internet communications has several privacy issues surrounding it. A large amount of information passing through the internet is encrypted, thus making it difficult to intercept. "Wiretapping" optical lines involves splitting, which degrades the signal strength, unlike typical phone line wiretapping. Because the information is essentially anonymous once it leaves the local network and enters the world wide web, is it even possible to filter out a single person's communication? If there is a back door for government internet surveillance capabilities, how can the typical American be assured that this backdoor is only used by the government?

===Encryption===
Especially when talking about VOIP, much communication is encrypted. Even the networks serving such content cannot decrypt the content without the decryption key. The United States government has requested a backdoor to such communication in the past, but it could not be provided by the VOIP networks that supported such encryption. If these networks can allow for criminal communication without a method for the government to intercept the communication, should they be allowed to exist? Or should citizens be allowed to have a form of communication that they can be reasonably assured is completely private?

===Splitting optical communication===
With electrical communications, government organizations could easily start intercepting information without affecting that communication in any way. This can not be done with optical communications. Therefore, in order to allow surveillance effectively, the intercepting of information must have already been started before it was requested. This means that average citizens of the United States will have the information intercepted (even if ir is not recorded) regardless of whether the citizen is under suspicion. Shouldn't unsuspected people be allowed privacy of their communications? Moreover, does the interception, even without use, of a person's communications, without probable cause, violate their Constitutional rights? To many, it would seem so.

===Difficulty of filtering===
Most legal surveillance depends upon the government's right to intercept communication from or to a particular person or organization. However, in many circumstances, this is impossible without intercepting a large amount of communication between other people. Since this information is intercepted, a government agent could stumble upon private communications. The only method preventing this accidental invasion of privacy is through the use of programs that attempt to filter out only certain types of data. Since it cannot be proven that such filters will actually prevent invasion of privacy, should the government be allowed to intercept communications when they can't intercept only the suspected persons' data? What if the program could filter out all unsuspected individuals? Would it not still be an invasion of privacy for those communications to be intercepted and stored even if they are later filtered out?

===Backdoor security===
Having a backdoor for internet surveillance must be extremely secure. If a government agency can use the backdoor to intercept communications when given the appropriate authority, how can we be sure that such a backdoor can't be used by anyone with sufficient technical knowledge, even without appropriate authority? Especially when dealing with the NSA, citizens fear that given an inch, they will take a mile. Allowing the backdoor to exist gives them the opportunity to use it at their own discretion no matter what the legal authority says. Just as well, building a backdoor into a system that doesn't intrinsically have such a backdoor lowers the security of the entire system. It may be possible for criminals to use the backdoor created in order to combat them for their own cybercrime.

'''Links'''
* [http://pressesc.com/01178899253_bill_bans_eavedropping_NSA Recent bill passed against NSA surveillance]
* [http://www.securityfocus.com/news/8394 Conforming to CALEA]
* [http://www.correntewire.com/nsa_spying_on_all_internet_traffic Full information on AT&T secret rooms]

==Ethical issues with the limits of internet surveillance==
Internet surveillance is a very touchy issue for many people. There is a wide range of thought and laws regarding the limits to which such surveillance can go. Especially recently and due to the Patriot Act, there is an increasing difference between how much surveillance can be done on foreign communications versus domestic communications. There is a question, especially due to the NSA's recent actions to make it easier to intercept data, about how much data can be acquired before a warrant or other such authority is required. Of equal concern as the amount of data is its type. Can government agencies freely collect information about where you send emails as long as they don't collect the content? Can they, in fact, collect the content itself? Perhaps more importantly, should they collect either?

===Foreign and domestic communications===
There is a general idea that foreign communications should be closely monitored in order to prevent terrorism. However, most Americans also value their personal privacy and think that unsuspected citizens shouldn't have their everyday communications recorded and scrutinized by government officials, even when such communications extend overseas. Therefore, there exists the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) which allows a great deal of intelligence gathering for foreign communications that are not allowed for domestic law enforcement. In recent times, many citizens believe that the NSA has gathered information on internet traffic that is unrelated to international matters. Another interesting international surveillance issue deals with the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention. This would have allowed foreign governments to request the NSA to intercept Americans. Should foreign governments be allowed to intercept internet data of Americans? Should domestic government agencies be allowed to investigate crimes through internet communications? Should the United States have different policies regarding international communications and domestic communications?

===Requiring a warrant===
Naturally, most Americans favor requiring a warrant to intercept internet communication. However, the NSA has allegedly conducted much surveillance in recent years specifically without a warrant. Some people have pursued a [http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9026379 lawsuit] against the NSA for such information gathering. However, the lawsuit was thrown out because the people could not show that the NSA's gathering of information damaged them in any way, regardless of the manner in which the NSA had gathered the data. The EFF also [http://boingboing.net/2006/01/31/eff_suing_att_for_he.html sued] AT&T for allowing the NSA to illegally gather data through the use of secret rooms. Should a warrant be required for putting the technology in place for surveillance? Or should a warrant simply be required for using such surveillance technology? If the NSA is brought to court for gathering data, shouldn't the proof needed to find the NSA guilty simply be the gathering of data without warrant, rather than whether the data gathered caused any harm to the individual? As civil cases require such a demonstration of damages, and criminal charges against the federal government are nearly impossible without unconstitutionality, what recourse is left to citizens?

===What types of data can be collected?===
During police investigations, what types of information can be gathered about an individual's internet communication before a warrant is issued? This is an especially important question because the data that can be collected without getting a warrant is the data that can be used as evidence to request such a warrant. The typical idea is that meta-data about the communications can be collected prior to obtaining a warrant, whereas the content of the communication cannot. This meta-data typically consists of who sent the communication, to whom the communication was sent, the time and date of the communication, and (where applicable) the length or size of the communication. This is all information that can be gathered about email and VOIP communication without the ability to intercept the actual content of the message. Are these types of data invasion of privacy? Should such data require a warrant as well? Should such data require at least suspicion of one of communicators in a currently investigated crime?

'''Links'''
* [http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1895253,00.asp ACLU against 'wiretapping' of VOIP]
* [http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-6037598.html Allowing email surveillance without warrant]
* [http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0121-01.htm International law enforcement agreements]
* [http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/03/whistleblower_h.html Whistle-blowing about NSA rooms]
* [http://www.correntewire.com/nsa_spying_on_all_internet_traffic Full information on AT&T secret rooms]
* [http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9026379 Recent dismissal of case against NSA]
* [http://pressesc.com/01178899253_bill_bans_eavedropping_NSA Recent bill passed against NSA surveillance]
* [http://boingboing.net/2006/01/31/eff_suing_att_for_he.html EFF sues AT&T for helping NSA]

=Prompt=
During the mid 1990s, one would consider himself/herself lucky to find what one was looking for though an internet search. As internet usage has grown, better search technologies has emerged displacing many human created directory-based search engines with ones providing a vast array of dynamically-created and helpful results. Technologies such as Google Alerts allows the tracking of yourself and others content on the internet based on keyword identifiers. Voluntary technologies such as blogs, online photo albums, and social networking have added a wealth of information available about us online.

AT&T has come under scrutiny by members of the public for allegedly constructing “NSA rooms” containing equipment that has the capability to monitor large amounts of internet traffic and are only accessible special US Government-affiliated staff members.

'''Examine a variety of ethical concerns related to tracking of both voluntarily and non-voluntarily provided information on the internet by members of the public, employers, government, and schools. Cite relevant laws, policies, and/or actions taken that are related to these concerns.'''

=Public and Government Surveillance=
With the convenience of electronic communication via the Internet, it has become very apparent more and more services are moved over to the Internet. For instance, it is fairly common to pay one's bills online instead of waiting for the bill and mailing a check. Video conferencing and Voice Over IP ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VOIP VOIP]) has enriched and eased the process of how one communicates with another. With that enrichment and ease comes the issue of usage and ethical interpretation. The ethical issues of Internet surveillance, as with most technologies, is determined by how it is used and by whom.

When discussing the issues of Internet surveillance, there are times when the boundaries between public and government are indistinguishable. For instance, how does one determine the ethical "rightness/wrongness" when the issue in question is pertinent to both sides? Some of these issues are addressed at [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=SourceWatch SourceWatch] (a subset of the [http://www.prwatch.org/ Center for Media and Democracy]). Three such cross boundary issues are the Echelon Project, Carnivore System, and DPI.

====Echelon====
The Echelon Project first became prominent during the 1990's as the [http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=telephone+freaking&btnG=Search "freaking"] and other underground communities became aware of such surveillance systems. It was speculated that the Echelon system was essentially an array of supercomputers designed to sniff out and analyze all forms of electronic communications with primary interest in telephone systems. The belief was partly fueled by huge increases in government spending on buying supercomputers during the 1990s. Due to the conflict with civilian rights, some believe the U.S. government was able to bypass the law by moving the monitoring offshore (thus no longer under U.S. privacy laws). It should be noted that the U.S. is believed to be one of the contributers to the system. The main Echelon installation is believed to reside in Australia.

One of the issues is not the technology itself but how it is used. From the standpoint of national security, it could be argued that it may intrude on some "rights," but the benefits outweigh the costs and infringements on personal liberties. From the individual point of view, it could be argued that it is in fact an invasion, and with that invasion, the information obtained may be used with malice.

Some useful links for Echelon:
* [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=ECHELON Echelon - SourceWatch]
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECHELON Wiki of Echelon]
* [http://cryptome.org/echelon-60min.htm 60minute transcript 60-Minutes Transcript discussing Echelon]
* [http://www.google.com/search?q=echelon Google Search for Echelon]

====Carnivore====
The Carnivore system (aka DCS1000) also became prominent during the 1990's when the FBI and other government agencies began to install the devices at major ISP locations. Carnivore is another analysis tool that allowed the system to sniff out and analyze network traffic. The commotion became apparent at the time primarily because of the scope of the abilities of the device in question. At the time, network sniffers and analysis tools were available that served the same functions as Carnivore, but not at the same scale. Additionally, at the time most emails were sent over the network in plaintext.

The primary issue here is again the same as Echelon; the technology by itself has no ethical value, it is the use of it that introduces ethical concerns. The same argument was used for or against Carnivore.

Some useful links for Carnivore:
* [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Carnivore Carnivore - SourceWatch]
* [http://r-s-g.org/carnivore/ The actual program itself.]
* [http://www.google.com/search?q=Carnivore Google Search for Carnivore]
* [http://www.google.com/search?q=DCS1000 Google Search for DCS1000]

====DPI====
DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) is essentially an examination of the IP packet as it traverses the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model OSI] layers. DPI spawned from the same technology that spawned SPI (Stateful Packet Inspection), first made prominent by Check Point Software's Firewall-1. With the speed of computers increasing at such a rapid pace, it has allowed DPI to dig down from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_layer Layer 7] to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_link_layer Layer 2] and reconstruct whole transmissions; compared to the static packet inspection (which primarily inspected the packet headers). Again, the technology of DPI is not something new. Network tools and analysis have had these types of capabilities for many years. The only difference now is how deep the inspection is going and scale of the inspection. What makes DPI implementations dangerous is the fact that current technology allows these inspections to be done in real time on hundreds of thousands of simultaneous connections with hardware that is not too cost prohibitve. For instance, some types of analysis required supercomputer number crunching capabilities, but current DPI hardware only costs in the range of hundreds of thousands. What makes the potential for abuse even more dangerous is that it applies to all network traffic, everything from application specific to services such as [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VOIP VOIP]. Along with the potential abuse of civil rights, the issue of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_Neutrality Net Neutrality] comes into play.

Again the ethical issue is how the technology is used. For instance, one could prioritize traffic to meet specific needs. Such an example is to inspect the traffic and allocate the bandwidth to needs, such as lowering BitTorrent traffic priority to VOIP traffic during business hours. Another potential good is to inspect and if there exists some malicious payload (like a virus) then deal with it properly before getting to the user. The other side is one of potential abuse, such as the issue of Net Neutrality. The consumer is hurt if specific traffic is steered and manipulated based on criteria other than the needs of the consumer.

Some useful links for DPI:
* [http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1716 Security Focus Primer on DPI]
* [http://www.esoft.com/pdf/White%20Paper%20-%20Migration%20to%20DPI.pdf Whitepaper by ESoft (a supplier of DPI products)]
* [http://www.linuxdevices.com/articles/AT8138920604.html Review of Bivio 7000, a Linux based DPI network appliancel.]

Due to the fact that public and government are dependent upon each other, there are many issues regarding the boundaries of where one ends and begins. At one side, the government by definition is to exist and provide laws for the masses. Yet, not all laws are capable of defining boundaries for all citizens; as such, the best it can do is to address the majority at large (thus the democracy). Yet on the other side, how does one define when that "majority at large" is no longer sufficient? Additionally, it could be said that certain types of civil rights are not as important as others. Yet, one individual may value certain "rights" more than others, thus how would one address such issues?

At times there are no specific boundaries, the interpretation of whether a technology is ethical is dependent upon the utilization of said technology. Thus, the issue becomes one of not addressing the technology but how it is used (potential for good/bad). And how it is used is dependent upon interpretation.

One possible solution to the weary individual is the use of strong encryption (such as [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography ECC] and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard Rijndael]). To address government issues, there needs to be more control and legislation on the uses of these technology. Although there are great potential of these technologies to preserve individual rights and freedoms, there is also great potential for abuse.

=Employer Surveillance=
In recent years, Internet surveillance by employers, or potential employers, has become an increasingly common phenomenon. Many companies - from multinational corporations to small owner-operator businesses - run software on company computers to [http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs7-work.htm monitor] employee behavior and Internet usage. As this surveillance is conducted on company-owned machines and typically during the business day, when an employee is being paid to perform a particular set of tasks, this practice is largely recognized as justified, and is in fact the official policy of many organizations. However, while certain organizations' surveillance is limited to applications as simple as filtering out social networking sites and private email, some companies go so far as to log all website requests from company computers, or even screenshots and keystroke records. Employers almost unanimously defend these practices as ethical, pointing out their ownership of the machines being monitored and an employee's duty to perform the job for which he or she is being paid with adequate focus and dedication. However, in response to some of the more stringent surveillance policies, employees not few in number have pointed out that on the occasion that a legitimate reason for personal use of a business machine might arise, an employer may unfairly collect sensitive personal data, such as passwords or the contents of personal emails, even if the personal use is due to an extenuating circumstance.

Another, perhaps more questionable policy is the execution of informal "Google checks" or "Net checks," in which employees are subject to a background check consisting of whatever information the employeer can find on Google, or social networking and blog such as Myspace, Facebook, Blogspot, or LiveJournal. From the employer's point of view, this allows an inspection of the potential employee's character, an examination of what behavior they are comfortable making public to friends or the general public. [http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070510-google-search-by-employer-not-illegal-say-judges.html Legally,] this is a viable option, as the Equal Opportunity Employee Act does not forbid frivolous job requirements, so long as they do not discriminate by race, religion, gender, national origin, or a few other criteria. Thus, an employer is free to make a hiring decision based on the content of one's social networking sites, news reports on the internet, or blog posts. Many employers defend the ethical nature of this practice by insisting that the content one chooses to voluntarily put online reflects his or her personality, habits, and morals, any one of which could be an indication of job candidate quality. In their defense, employees reply that their private life, so long as it does not conflict with legality, should be of no concern to their chances of being hired for a job unless it would directly interfere with job performance. In the United States, the law sides with the employers, but the ethical choice is a matter of personal decision.

=School Survailence=
The issues raised by Internet surveillance of students by academic institutions largely parallel those concerned in the matter of employers conducting surveillance on employees. Often, especially in public primary and secondary schools, content is automatically assessed and screened. Initially, only adult content was filtered, which few individuals, if any, would consider an objectionable policy. However, over the years, the scope of filtered material has increased, to the point where it now includes email, social networking, blog, and even political and international sites. Such filtering of educational sites is often [http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/filterlaws.htm required by law.] School administrators cite the fact that the majority of websites are either obviously inappropriate for children or a waste of school time, but, conversely, others have observed that the scope of filtered material now includes much which could be considered usefully educational.

In the realm of higher education, voluntarily created blogs or social networking sites are sometimes perused by [http://voice.paly.net/view_story.php?id=4509 admissions officers,] much as they often are by potential employers, potentially jeopardizing admission to universities for pictures or comments denoting behavior such as drinking, spoking or drug use, whether illegal or conventionally immoral. Much as screened employees argue that their hiring for a job should be based on their qualifications for the job alone, students object that their academic qualifications or athletic abilities should be the deciding factors for their admission to an academic institution. However, admissions officers have been known to argue that students who engage in illegal activity are not the sort of students that universities desire. Additionally, university officials have been known to report illegal behavior to authorities with pictures from social networking sites as [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use_of_social_network_websites_in_investigations evidence.] Prosecuted individuals decry this as unfair, but to the courts, photographic evidence of illegal behavior, if those photographs are made public, are evidence of crime, and voluntary evidence at that.

Ironically, the usefulness of these online screening techniques for assessing potential employees and students are becoming less and less effective. As these policies of employers and universities are increasingly publicized, students and employees are learning to more tightly control content on, or at least access to, websites which contain personal, perhaps compromising information.

=Resources=
==Relevant External Links:==
* [http://boingboing.net/2006/01/31/eff_suing_att_for_he.html EFF suing AT&T for helping NSA]
==Relevant Class Website Links:==
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/web/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/web/]
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/mining/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/mining/]
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/surveillance/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/surveillance/]
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/financial/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/financial/]

CSC 379:Week 4, Group 1

2007-07-29T00:24:51Z

Jjpittar:

=Internet Surveillance (e.g. AT&T’s NSA Rooms)=
==The issues concerning internet surveillance==
Most of us are aware of government surveillance as it pertains to wiretapping to listen in on phone conversations. This type of government surveillance has had many laws developed around it and how and when it may be done. With the growth of internet traffic, similar surveillance has appeared in the realms of email, voice over IP (VOIP), and general internet traffic. The same problems that occurred years ago for the telephone communications networks have been approached for internet communications.

The first issue that surrounds internet surveillance is how to make it possible. In order to conform to Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), phone networks had to be designed so that wiretapping was an easy thing to do if an appropriate government organization requested it. However, much internet traffic is optical instead of electrical. When electricity travels through a wire, it emits a small magnetic field. Something very close to the wire could intercept the electrical communication without affecting it. Optical communication doesn't "leak" any of the light, so the communication has to be disturbed in order to intercept it. This is usually done with a splitter which diverts a percentage of the light down another path.

The second issue is authority. Mainly, who decides whether and how much internet surveillance can take place. Should there be a different authority or amount of evidence in order to intercept foreign communications as opposed to domestic? Does the person whose information is being gathered have to be notified? Does the court have to issue a warrant for a government agency to investigate internet traffic? If so, how much information can be gathered without a warrant?

'''Links'''
* [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Internet_surveillance Basics of internet surveillance]
* [http://www.securityfocus.com/news/8394 Conforming to CALEA]

==Ethical issues with CALEA==
Making it possible to intercept internet communications has several privacy issues surrounding it. A large amount of information passing through the internet is encrypted, thus making it difficult to intercept. "Wiretapping" optical lines involves splitting, which degrades the signal strength, unlike typical phone line wiretapping. Because the information is essentially anonymous once it leaves the local network and enters the world wide web, is it even possible to filter out a single person's communication? If there is a back door for government internet surveillance capabilities, how can the typical American be assured that this backdoor is only used by the government?

===Encryption===
Especially when talking about VOIP, much communication is encrypted. Even the networks serving such content cannot decrypt the content without the decryption key. The United States government has requested a backdoor to such communication in the past, but it could not be provided by the VOIP networks that supported such encryption. If these networks can allow for criminal communication without a method for the government to intercept the communication, should they be allowed to exist? Or should citizens be allowed to have a form of communication that they can be reasonably assured is completely private?

===Splitting optical communication===
With electrical communications, government organizations could easily start intercepting information without affecting that communication in any way. This can not be done with optical communications. Therefore, in order to allow surveillance effectively, the intercepting of information must have already been started before it was requested. This means that average citizens of the United States will have the information intercepted (even if ir is not recorded) regardless of whether the citizen is under suspicion. Shouldn't unsuspected people be allowed privacy of their communications? Moreover, does the interception, even without use, of a person's communications, without probable cause, violate their Constitutional rights? To many, it would seem so.

===Difficulty of filtering===
Most legal surveillance depends upon the government's right to intercept communication from or to a particular person or organization. However, in many circumstances, this is impossible without intercepting a large amount of communication between other people. Since this information is intercepted, a government agent could stumble upon private communications. The only method preventing this accidental invasion of privacy is through the use of programs that attempt to filter out only certain types of data. Since it cannot be proven that such filters will actually prevent invasion of privacy, should the government be allowed to intercept communications when they can't intercept only the suspected persons' data? What if the program could filter out all unsuspected individuals? Would it not still be an invasion of privacy for those communications to be intercepted and stored even if they are later filtered out?

===Backdoor security===
Having a backdoor for internet surveillance must be extremely secure. If a government agency can use the backdoor to intercept communications when given the appropriate authority, how can we be sure that such a backdoor can't be used by anyone with sufficient technical knowledge, even without appropriate authority? Especially when dealing with the NSA, citizens fear that given an inch, they will take a mile. Allowing the backdoor to exist gives them the opportunity to use it at their own discretion no matter what the legal authority says. Just as well, building a backdoor into a system that doesn't intrinsically have such a backdoor lowers the security of the entire system. It may be possible for criminals to use the backdoor created in order to combat them for their own cybercrime.

'''Links'''
* [http://pressesc.com/01178899253_bill_bans_eavedropping_NSA Recent bill passed against NSA surveillance]
* [http://www.securityfocus.com/news/8394 Conforming to CALEA]
* [http://www.correntewire.com/nsa_spying_on_all_internet_traffic Full information on AT&T secret rooms]

==Ethical issues with the limits of internet surveillance==
Internet surveillance is a very touchy issue for many people. There is a wide range of thought and laws regarding the limits to which such surveillance can go. Especially recently and due to the Patriot Act, there is an increasing difference between how much surveillance can be done on foreign communications versus domestic communications. There is a question, especially due to the NSA's recent actions to make it easier to intercept data, about how much data can be acquired before a warrant or other such authority is required. Of equal concern as the amount of data is its type. Can government agencies freely collect information about where you send emails as long as they don't collect the content? Can they, in fact, collect the content itself? Perhaps more importantly, should they collect either?

===Foreign and domestic communications===
There is a general idea that foreign communications should be closely monitored in order to prevent terrorism. However, most Americans also value their personal privacy and think that unsuspected citizens shouldn't have their everyday communications recorded and scrutinized by government officials, even when such communications extend overseas. Therefore, there exists the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) which allows a great deal of intelligence gathering for foreign communications that are not allowed for domestic law enforcement. In recent times, many citizens believe that the NSA has gathered information on internet traffic that is unrelated to international matters. Another interesting international surveillance issue deals with the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention. This would have allowed foreign governments to request the NSA to intercept Americans. Should foreign governments be allowed to intercept internet data of Americans? Should domestic government agencies be allowed to investigate crimes through internet communications? Should the United States have different policies regarding international communications and domestic communications?

===Requiring a warrant===
Naturally, most Americans favor requiring a warrant to intercept internet communication. However, the NSA has allegedly conducted much surveillance in recent years specifically without a warrant. Some people have pursued a [http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9026379 lawsuit] against the NSA for such information gathering. However, the lawsuit was thrown out because the people could not show that the NSA's gathering of information damaged them in any way, regardless of the manner in which the NSA had gathered the data. The EFF also [http://boingboing.net/2006/01/31/eff_suing_att_for_he.html sued] AT&T for allowing the NSA to illegally gather data through the use of secret rooms. Should a warrant be required for putting the technology in place for surveillance? Or should a warrant simply be required for using such surveillance technology? If the NSA is brought to court for gathering data, shouldn't the proof needed to find the NSA guilty simply be the gathering of data without warrant, rather than whether the data gathered caused any harm to the individual? As civil cases require such a demonstration of damages, and criminal charges against the federal government are nearly impossible without unconstitutionality, what recourse is left to citizens?

===What types of data can be collected?===
During police investigations, what types of information can be gathered about an individual's internet communication before a warrant is issued? This is an especially important question because the data that can be collected without getting a warrant is the data that can be used as evidence to request such a warrant. The typical idea is that meta-data about the communications can be collected prior to obtaining a warrant, whereas the content of the communication cannot. This meta-data typically consists of who sent the communication, to whom the communication was sent, the time and date of the communication, and (where applicable) the length or size of the communication. This is all information that can be gathered about email and VOIP communication without the ability to intercept the actual content of the message. Are these types of data invasion of privacy? Should such data require a warrant as well? Should such data require at least suspicion of one of communicators in a currently investigated crime?

'''Links'''
* [http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1895253,00.asp ACLU against 'wiretapping' of VOIP]
* [http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-6037598.html Allowing email surveillance without warrant]
* [http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0121-01.htm International law enforcement agreements]
* [http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/03/whistleblower_h.html Whistle-blowing about NSA rooms]
* [http://www.correntewire.com/nsa_spying_on_all_internet_traffic Full information on AT&T secret rooms]
* [http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9026379 Recent dismissal of case against NSA]
* [http://pressesc.com/01178899253_bill_bans_eavedropping_NSA Recent bill passed against NSA surveillance]
* [http://boingboing.net/2006/01/31/eff_suing_att_for_he.html EFF sues AT&T for helping NSA]

=Prompt=
During the mid 1990s, one would consider himself/herself lucky to find what one was looking for though an internet search. As internet usage has grown, better search technologies has emerged displacing many human created directory-based search engines with ones providing a vast array of dynamically-created and helpful results. Technologies such as Google Alerts allows the tracking of yourself and others content on the internet based on keyword identifiers. Voluntary technologies such as blogs, online photo albums, and social networking have added a wealth of information available about us online.

AT&T has come under scrutiny by members of the public for allegedly constructing “NSA rooms” containing equipment that has the capability to monitor large amounts of internet traffic and are only accessible special US Government-affiliated staff members.

'''Examine a variety of ethical concerns related to tracking of both voluntarily and non-voluntarily provided information on the internet by members of the public, employers, government, and schools. Cite relevant laws, policies, and/or actions taken that are related to these concerns.'''

=Public and Government Surveillance=
With the convenience of electronic communication via the Internet, it has become very apparent more and more services are moved over to the Internet. For instance, it is fairly common to pay one's bills online instead of waiting for the bill and mailing a check. Video conferencing and Voice Over IP ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VOIP VOIP]) has enriched and eased the process of how one communicates with another. With that enrichment and ease comes the issue of usage and ethical interpretation. The ethical issues of Internet surveillance, as with most technologies, is determined by how it is used and by whom.

When discussing the issues of Internet surveillance, there are times when the boundaries between public and government are indistinguishable. For instance, how does one determine the ethical "rightness/wrongness" when the issue in question is pertinent to both sides? Some of these issues are addressed at [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=SourceWatch SourceWatch] (a subset of the [http://www.prwatch.org/ Center for Media and Democracy]). Three such cross boundary issues are the Echelon Project, Carnivore System, and DPI.

====Echelon====
The Echelon Project first became prominent during the 1990's as the [http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=telephone+freaking&btnG=Search "freaking"] and other underground communities became aware of such surveillance systems. It was speculated that the Echelon system was essentially an array of supercomputers designed to sniff out and analyze all forms of electronic communications with primary interest in telephone systems. The belief was partly fueled by huge increases in government spending on buying supercomputers during the 1990s. Due to the conflict with civilian rights, some believe the U.S. government was able to bypass the law by moving the monitoring offshore (thus no longer under U.S. privacy laws). It should be noted that the U.S. is believed to be one of the contributers to the system. The main Echelon installation is believed to reside in Australia.

One of the issues is not the technology itself but how it is used. From the standpoint of national security, it could be argued that it may intrude on some "rights," but the benefits outweigh the costs and infringements on personal liberties. From the individual point of view, it could be argued that it is in fact an invasion, and with that invasion, the information obtained may be used with malice.

Some useful links for Echelon:
* [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=ECHELON Echelon - SourceWatch]
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECHELON Wiki of Echelon]
* [http://cryptome.org/echelon-60min.htm 60minute transcript 60-Minutes Transcript discussing Echelon]
* [http://www.google.com/search?q=echelon Google Search for Echelon]

====Carnivore====
The Carnivore system (aka DCS1000) also became prominent during the 1990's when the FBI and other government agencies began to install the devices at major ISP locations. Carnivore is another analysis tool that allowed the system to sniff out and analyze network traffic. The commotion became apparent at the time primarily because of the scope of the abilities of the device in question. At the time, network sniffers and analysis tools were available that served the same functions as Carnivore, but not at the same scale. Additionally, at the time most emails were sent over the network in plaintext.

The primary issue here is again the same as Echelon; the technology by itself has no ethical value, it is the use of it that introduces ethical concerns. The same argument was used for or against Carnivore.

Some useful links for Carnivore:
* [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Carnivore Carnivore - SourceWatch]
* [http://r-s-g.org/carnivore/ The actual program itself.]
* [http://www.google.com/search?q=Carnivore Google Search for Carnivore]
* [http://www.google.com/search?q=DCS1000 Google Search for DCS1000]

====DPI====
DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) is essentially an examination of the IP packet as it traverses the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model OSI] layers. DPI spawned from the same technology that spawned SPI (Stateful Packet Inspection), first made prominent by Check Point Software's Firewall-1. With the speed of computers increasing at such a rapid pace, it has allowed DPI to dig down from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_layer Layer 7] to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_link_layer Layer 2] and reconstruct whole transmissions; compared to the static packet inspection (which primarily inspected the packet headers). Again, the technology of DPI is not something new. Network tools and analysis have had these types of capabilities for many years. The only difference now is how deep the inspection is going and scale of the inspection. What makes DPI implementations dangerous is the fact that current technology allows these inspections to be done in real time on hundreds of thousands of simultaneous connections with hardware that is not too cost prohibitve. For instance, some types of analysis required supercomputer number crunching capabilities, but current DPI hardware only costs in the range of hundreds of thousands. What makes the potential for abuse even more dangerous is that it applies to all network traffic, everything from application specific to services such as [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VOIP VOIP]. Along with the potential abuse of civil rights, the issue of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_Neutrality Net Neutrality] comes into play.

Again the ethical issue is how the technology is used. For instance, one could prioritize traffic to meet specific needs. Such an example is to inspect the traffic and allocate the bandwidth to needs, such as lowering BitTorrent traffic priority to VOIP traffic during business hours. Another potential good is to inspect and if there exists some malicious payload (like a virus) then deal with it properly before getting to the user. The other side is one of potential abuse, such as the issue of Net Neutrality. The consumer is hurt if specific traffic is steered and manipulated based on criteria other than the needs of the consumer.

Some useful links for DPI:
* [http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1716 Security Focus Primer on DPI]
* [http://www.esoft.com/pdf/White%20Paper%20-%20Migration%20to%20DPI.pdf Whitepaper by ESoft (a supplier of DPI products)]
* [http://www.linuxdevices.com/articles/AT8138920604.html Review of Bivio 7000, a Linux based DPI network appliancel.]

Due to the fact that public and government are dependent upon each other, there are many issues regarding the boundaries of where one ends and begins. At one side, the government by definition is to exist and provide laws for the masses. Yet, not all laws are capable of defining boundaries for all citizens; as such, the best it can do is to address the majority at large (thus the democracy). Yet on the other side, how does one define when that "majority at large" is no longer sufficient? Additionally, it could be said that certain types of civil rights are not as important as others. Yet, one individual may value certain "rights" more than others, thus how would one address such issues?

At times there are no specific boundaries, the interpretation of whether a technology is ethical is dependent upon the utilization of said technology. Thus, the issue becomes one of not addressing the technology but how it is used (potential for good/bad). And how it is used is dependent upon interpretation.

One possible solution to the weary individual is the use of strong encryption (such as [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography ECC] and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard Rijndael]). To address government issues, there needs to be more control and legislation on the uses of these technology. Although there are great potential of these technologies to preserve individual rights and freedoms, there is also great potential for abuse.

=Employer Surveillance=
In recent years, Internet surveillance by employers, or potential employers, has become an increasingly common phenomenon. Many companies - from multinational corporations to small owner-operator businesses - run software on company computers to [http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs7-work.htm monitor[ employee behavior and Internet usage. As this surveillance is conducted on company-owned machines and typically during the business day, when an employee is being paid to perform a particular set of tasks, this practice is largely recognized as justified, and is in fact the official policy of many organizations. However, while certain organizations' surveillance is limited to applications as simple as filtering out social networking sites and private email, some companies go so far as to log all website requests from company computers, or even screenshots and keystroke records. Employers almost unanimously defend these practices as ethical, pointing out their ownership of the machines being monitored and an employee's duty to perform the job for which he or she is being paid with adequate focus and dedication. However, in response to some of the more stringent surveillance policies, employees not few in number have pointed out that on the occasion that a legitimate reason for personal use of a business machine might arise, an employer may unfairly collect sensitive personal data, such as passwords or the contents of personal emails, even if the personal use is due to an extenuating circumstance.

Another, perhaps more questionable policy is the execution of informal "Google checks" or "Net checks," in which employees are subject to a background check consisting of whatever information the employeer can find on Google, or social networking and blog such as Myspace, Facebook, Blogspot, or LiveJournal. From the employer's point of view, this allows an inspection of the potential employee's character, an examination of what behavior they are comfortable making public to friends or the general public. [http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070510-google-search-by-employer-not-illegal-say-judges.html Legally,] this is a viable option, as the Equal Opportunity Employee Act does not forbid frivolous job requirements, so long as they do not discriminate by race, religion, gender, national origin, or a few other criteria. Thus, an employer is free to make a hiring decision based on the content of one's social networking sites, news reports on the internet, or blog posts. Many employers defend the ethical nature of this practice by insisting that the content one chooses to voluntarily put online reflects his or her personality, habits, and morals, any one of which could be an indication of job candidate quality. In their defense, employees reply that their private life, so long as it does not conflict with legality, should be of no concern to their chances of being hired for a job unless it would directly interfere with job performance. In the United States, the law sides with the employers, but the ethical choice is a matter of personal decision.

=School Survailence=
The issues raised by Internet surveillance of students by academic institutions largely parallel those concerned in the matter of employers conducting surveillance on employees. Often, especially in public primary and secondary schools, content is automatically assessed and screened. Initially, only adult content was filtered, which few individuals, if any, would consider an objectionable policy. However, over the years, the scope of filtered material has increased, to the point where it now includes email, social networking, blog, and even political and international sites. Such filtering of educational sites is often [http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/filterlaws.htm required by law.] School administrators cite the fact that the majority of websites are either obviously inappropriate for children or a waste of school time, but, conversely, others have observed that the scope of filtered material now includes much which could be considered usefully educational.

In the realm of higher education, voluntarily created blogs or social networking sites are sometimes perused by [http://voice.paly.net/view_story.php?id=4509 admissions officers,] much as they often are by potential employers, potentially jeopardizing admission to universities for pictures or comments denoting behavior such as drinking, spoking or drug use, whether illegal or conventionally immoral. Much as screened employees argue that their hiring for a job should be based on their qualifications for the job alone, students object that their academic qualifications or athletic abilities should be the deciding factors for their admission to an academic institution. However, admissions officers have been known to argue that students who engage in illegal activity are not the sort of students that universities desire. Additionally, university officials have been known to report illegal behavior to authorities with pictures from social networking sites as http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use_of_social_network_websites_in_investigations evidence.] Prosecuted individuals decry this as unfair, but to the courts, photographic evidence of illegal behavior, if those photographs are made public, are evidence of crime, and voluntary evidence at that.

Ironically, the usefulness of these online screening techniques for assessing potential employees and students are becoming less and less effective. As these policies of employers and universities are increasingly publicized, students and employees are learning to more tightly control content on, or at least access to, websites which contain personal, perhaps compromising information.

=Resources=
==Relevant External Links:==
* [http://boingboing.net/2006/01/31/eff_suing_att_for_he.html EFF suing AT&T for helping NSA]
==Relevant Class Website Links:==
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/web/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/web/]
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/mining/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/mining/]
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/surveillance/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/surveillance/]
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/financial/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/financial/]

CSC 379:Week 4, Group 1

2007-07-28T23:34:27Z

Jjpittar:

=Internet Surveillance (e.g. AT&T’s NSA Rooms)=
==The issues concerning internet surveillance==
Most of us are aware of government surveillance as it pertains to wiretapping to listen in on phone conversations. This type of government surveillance has had many laws developed around it and how and when it may be done. With the growth of internet traffic, similar surveillance has appeared in the realms of email, voice over IP (VOIP), and general internet traffic. The same problems that occurred years ago for the telephone communications networks have been approached for internet communications.

The first issue that surrounds internet surveillance is how to make it possible. In order to conform to Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), phone networks had to be designed so that wiretapping was an easy thing to do if an appropriate government organization requested it. However, much internet traffic is optical instead of electrical. When electricity travels through a wire, it emits a small magnetic field. Something very close to the wire could intercept the electrical communication without affecting it. Optical communication doesn't "leak" any of the light, so the communication has to be disturbed in order to intercept it. This is usually done with a splitter which diverts a percentage of the light down another path.

The second issue is authority. Mainly, who decides whether and how much internet surveillance can take place. Should there be a different authority or amount of evidence in order to intercept foreign communications as opposed to domestic? Does the person whose information is being gathered have to be notified? Does the court have to issue a warrant for a government agency to investigate internet traffic? If so, how much information can be gathered without a warrant?

'''Links'''
* [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Internet_surveillance Basics of internet surveillance]
* [http://www.securityfocus.com/news/8394 Conforming to CALEA]

==Ethical issues with CALEA==
Making it possible to intercept internet communications has several privacy issues surrounding it. A large amount of information passing through the internet is encrypted, thus making it difficult to intercept. "Wiretapping" optical lines involves splitting, which degrades the signal strength, unlike typical phone line wiretapping. Because the information is essentially anonymous once it leaves the local network and enters the world wide web, is it even possible to filter out a single person's communication? If there is a back door for government internet surveillance capabilities, how can the typical American be assured that this backdoor is only used by the government?

===Encryption===
Especially when talking about VOIP, much communication is encrypted. Even the networks serving such content cannot decrypt the content without the decryption key. The United States government has requested a backdoor to such communication in the past, but it could not be provided by the VOIP networks that supported such encryption. If these networks can allow for criminal communication without a method for the government to intercept the communication, should they be allowed to exist? Or should citizens be allowed to have a form of communication that they can be reasonably assured is completely private?

===Splitting optical communication===
With electrical communications, government organizations could easily start intercepting information without affecting that communication in any way. This can not be done with optical communications. Therefore, in order to allow surveillance effectively, the intercepting of information must have already been started before it was requested. This means that average citizens of the United States will have the information intercepted (even if ir is not recorded) regardless of whether the citizen is under suspicion. Shouldn't unsuspected people be allowed privacy of their communications? Moreover, does the interception, even without use, of a person's communications, without probable cause, violate their Constitutional rights? To many, it would seem so.

===Difficulty of filtering===
Most legal surveillance depends upon the government's right to intercept communication from or to a particular person or organization. However, in many circumstances, this is impossible without intercepting a large amount of communication between other people. Since this information is intercepted, a government agent could stumble upon private communications. The only method preventing this accidental invasion of privacy is through the use of programs that attempt to filter out only certain types of data. Since it cannot be proven that such filters will actually prevent invasion of privacy, should the government be allowed to intercept communications when they can't intercept only the suspected persons' data? What if the program could filter out all unsuspected individuals? Would it not still be an invasion of privacy for those communications to be intercepted and stored even if they are later filtered out?

===Backdoor security===
Having a backdoor for internet surveillance must be extremely secure. If a government agency can use the backdoor to intercept communications when given the appropriate authority, how can we be sure that such a backdoor can't be used by anyone with sufficient technical knowledge, even without appropriate authority? Especially when dealing with the NSA, citizens fear that given an inch, they will take a mile. Allowing the backdoor to exist gives them the opportunity to use it at their own discretion no matter what the legal authority says. Just as well, building a backdoor into a system that doesn't intrinsically have such a backdoor lowers the security of the entire system. It may be possible for criminals to use the backdoor created in order to combat them for their own cybercrime.

'''Links'''
* [http://pressesc.com/01178899253_bill_bans_eavedropping_NSA Recent bill passed against NSA surveillance]
* [http://www.securityfocus.com/news/8394 Conforming to CALEA]
* [http://www.correntewire.com/nsa_spying_on_all_internet_traffic Full information on AT&T secret rooms]

==Ethical issues with the limits of internet surveillance==
Internet surveillance is a very touchy issue for many people. There is a wide range of thought and laws regarding the limits to which such surveillance can go. Especially recently and due to the Patriot Act, there is an increasing difference between how much surveillance can be done on foreign communications versus domestic communications. There is a question, especially due to the NSA's recent actions to make it easier to intercept data, about how much data can be acquired before a warrant or other such authority is required. Of equal concern as the amount of data is its type. Can government agencies freely collect information about where you send emails as long as they don't collect the content? Can they, in fact, collect the content itself? Perhaps more importantly, should they collect either?

===Foreign and domestic communications===
There is a general idea that foreign communications should be closely monitored in order to prevent terrorism. However, most Americans also value their personal privacy and think that unsuspected citizens shouldn't have their everyday communications recorded and scrutinized by government officials, even when such communications extend overseas. Therefore, there exists the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) which allows a great deal of intelligence gathering for foreign communications that are not allowed for domestic law enforcement. In recent times, many citizens believe that the NSA has gathered information on internet traffic that is unrelated to international matters. Another interesting international surveillance issue deals with the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention. This would have allowed foreign governments to request the NSA to intercept Americans. Should foreign governments be allowed to intercept internet data of Americans? Should domestic government agencies be allowed to investigate crimes through internet communications? Should the United States have different policies regarding international communications and domestic communications?

===Requiring a warrant===
Naturally, most Americans favor requiring a warrant to intercept internet communication. However, the NSA has allegedly conducted much surveillance in recent years specifically without a warrant. Some people have pursued a [http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9026379 lawsuit] against the NSA for such information gathering. However, the lawsuit was thrown out because the people could not show that the NSA's gathering of information damaged them in any way, regardless of the manner in which the NSA had gathered the data. The EFF also [http://boingboing.net/2006/01/31/eff_suing_att_for_he.html sued] AT&T for allowing the NSA to illegally gather data through the use of secret rooms. Should a warrant be required for putting the technology in place for surveillance? Or should a warrant simply be required for using such surveillance technology? If the NSA is brought to court for gathering data, shouldn't the proof needed to find the NSA guilty simply be the gathering of data without warrant, rather than whether the data gathered caused any harm to the individual? As civil cases require such a demonstration of damages, and criminal charges against the federal government are nearly impossible without unconstitutionality, what recourse is left to citizens?

===What types of data can be collected?===
During police investigations, what types of information can be gathered about an individual's internet communication before a warrant is issued? This is an especially important question because the data that can be collected without getting a warrant is the data that can be used as evidence to request such a warrant. The typical idea is that meta-data about the communications can be collected prior to obtaining a warrant, whereas the content of the communication cannot. This meta-data typically consists of who sent the communication, to whom the communication was sent, the time and date of the communication, and (where applicable) the length or size of the communication. This is all information that can be gathered about email and VOIP communication without the ability to intercept the actual content of the message. Are these types of data invasion of privacy? Should such data require a warrant as well? Should such data require at least suspicion of one of communicators in a currently investigated crime?

'''Links'''
* [http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1895253,00.asp ACLU against 'wiretapping' of VOIP]
* [http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-6037598.html Allowing email surveillance without warrant]
* [http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0121-01.htm International law enforcement agreements]
* [http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/03/whistleblower_h.html Whistle-blowing about NSA rooms]
* [http://www.correntewire.com/nsa_spying_on_all_internet_traffic Full information on AT&T secret rooms]
* [http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9026379 Recent dismissal of case against NSA]
* [http://pressesc.com/01178899253_bill_bans_eavedropping_NSA Recent bill passed against NSA surveillance]
* [http://boingboing.net/2006/01/31/eff_suing_att_for_he.html EFF sues AT&T for helping NSA]

=Prompt=
During the mid 1990s, one would consider himself/herself lucky to find what one was looking for though an internet search. As internet usage has grown, better search technologies has emerged displacing many human created directory-based search engines with ones providing a vast array of dynamically-created and helpful results. Technologies such as Google Alerts allows the tracking of yourself and others content on the internet based on keyword identifiers. Voluntary technologies such as blogs, online photo albums, and social networking have added a wealth of information available about us online.

AT&T has come under scrutiny by members of the public for allegedly constructing “NSA rooms” containing equipment that has the capability to monitor large amounts of internet traffic and are only accessible special US Government-affiliated staff members.

'''Examine a variety of ethical concerns related to tracking of both voluntarily and non-voluntarily provided information on the internet by members of the public, employers, government, and schools. Cite relevant laws, policies, and/or actions taken that are related to these concerns.'''

=Public and Government Surveillance=
With the convenience of electronic communication via the Internet, it has become very apparent more and more services are moved over to the Internet. For instance, it is fairly common to pay one's bills online instead of waiting for the bill and mailing a check. Video conferencing and Voice Over IP ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VOIP VOIP]) has enriched and eased the process of how one communicates with another. With that enrichment and ease comes the issue of usage and ethical interpretation. The ethical issues of Internet surveillance, as with most technologies, is determined by how it is used and by whom.

When discussing the issues of Internet surveillance, there are times when the boundaries between public and government are indistinguishable. For instance, how does one determine the ethical "rightness/wrongness" when the issue in question is pertinent to both sides? Some of these issues are addressed at [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=SourceWatch SourceWatch] (a subset of the [http://www.prwatch.org/ Center for Media and Democracy]). Three such cross boundary issues are the Echelon Project, Carnivore System, and DPI.

====Echelon====
The Echelon Project first became prominent during the 1990's as the [http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=telephone+freaking&btnG=Search "freaking"] and other underground communities became aware of such surveillance systems. It was speculated that the Echelon system was essentially an array of supercomputers designed to sniff out and analyze all forms of electronic communications with primary interest in telephone systems. The belief was partly fueled by huge increases in government spending on buying supercomputers during the 1990s. Due to the conflict with civilian rights, some believe the U.S. government was able to bypass the law by moving the monitoring offshore (thus no longer under U.S. privacy laws). It should be noted that the U.S. is believed to be one of the contributers to the system. The main Echelon installation is believed to reside in Australia.

One of the issues is not the technology itself but how it is used. From the standpoint of national security, it could be argued that it may intrude on some "rights," but the benefits outweigh the costs and infringements on personal liberties. From the individual point of view, it could be argued that it is in fact an invasion, and with that invasion, the information obtained may be used with malice.

Some useful links for Echelon:
* [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=ECHELON Echelon - SourceWatch]
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECHELON Wiki of Echelon]
* [http://cryptome.org/echelon-60min.htm 60minute transcript 60-Minutes Transcript discussing Echelon]
* [http://www.google.com/search?q=echelon Google Search for Echelon]

====Carnivore====
The Carnivore system (aka DCS1000) also became prominent during the 1990's when the FBI and other government agencies began to install the devices at major ISP locations. Carnivore is another analysis tool that allowed the system to sniff out and analyze network traffic. The commotion became apparent at the time primarily because of the scope of the abilities of the device in question. At the time, network sniffers and analysis tools were available that served the same functions as Carnivore, but not at the same scale. Additionally, at the time most emails were sent over the network in plaintext.

The primary issue here is again the same as Echelon; the technology by itself has no ethical value, it is the use of it that introduces ethical concerns. The same argument was used for or against Carnivore.

Some useful links for Carnivore:
* [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Carnivore Carnivore - SourceWatch]
* [http://r-s-g.org/carnivore/ The actual program itself.]
* [http://www.google.com/search?q=Carnivore Google Search for Carnivore]
* [http://www.google.com/search?q=DCS1000 Google Search for DCS1000]

====DPI====
DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) is essentially an examination of the IP packet as it traverses the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model OSI] layers. DPI spawned from the same technology that spawned SPI (Stateful Packet Inspection), first made prominent by Check Point Software's Firewall-1. With the speed of computers increasing at such a rapid pace, it has allowed DPI to dig down from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_layer Layer 7] to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_link_layer Layer 2] and reconstruct whole transmissions; compared to the static packet inspection (which primarily inspected the packet headers). Again, the technology of DPI is not something new. Network tools and analysis have had these types of capabilities for many years. The only difference now is how deep the inspection is going and scale of the inspection. What makes DPI implementations dangerous is the fact that current technology allows these inspections to be done in real time on hundreds of thousands of simultaneous connections with hardware that is not too cost prohibitve. For instance, some types of analysis required supercomputer number crunching capabilities, but current DPI hardware only costs in the range of hundreds of thousands. What makes the potential for abuse even more dangerous is that it applies to all network traffic, everything from application specific to services such as [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VOIP VOIP]. Along with the potential abuse of civil rights, the issue of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_Neutrality Net Neutrality] comes into play.

Again the ethical issue is how the technology is used. For instance, one could prioritize traffic to meet specific needs. Such an example is to inspect the traffic and allocate the bandwidth to needs, such as lowering BitTorrent traffic priority to VOIP traffic during business hours. Another potential good is to inspect and if there exists some malicious payload (like a virus) then deal with it properly before getting to the user. The other side is one of potential abuse, such as the issue of Net Neutrality. The consumer is hurt if specific traffic is steered and manipulated based on criteria other than the needs of the consumer.

Some useful links for DPI:
* [http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1716 Security Focus Primer on DPI]
* [http://www.esoft.com/pdf/White%20Paper%20-%20Migration%20to%20DPI.pdf Whitepaper by ESoft (a supplier of DPI products)]
* [http://www.linuxdevices.com/articles/AT8138920604.html Review of Bivio 7000, a Linux based DPI network appliancel.]

Due to the fact that public and government are dependent upon each other, there are many issues regarding the boundaries of where one ends and begins. At one side, the government by definition is to exist and provide laws for the masses. Yet, not all laws are capable of defining boundaries for all citizens; as such, the best it can do is to address the majority at large (thus the democracy). Yet on the other side, how does one define when that "majority at large" is no longer sufficient? Additionally, it could be said that certain types of civil rights are not as important as others. Yet, one individual may value certain "rights" more than others, thus how would one address such issues?

At times there are no specific boundaries, the interpretation of whether a technology is ethical is dependent upon the utilization of said technology. Thus, the issue becomes one of not addressing the technology but how it is used (potential for good/bad). And how it is used is dependent upon interpretation.

One possible solution to the weary individual is the use of strong encryption (such as [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography ECC] and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard Rijndael]). To address government issues, there needs to be more control and legislation on the uses of these technology. Although there are great potential of these technologies to preserve individual rights and freedoms, there is also great potential for abuse.

=Employer Surveillance=
In recent years, Internet surveillance by employers, or potential employers, has become an increasingly common phenomenon. Many companies - from multinational corporations to small owner-operator businesses - run software on company computers to monitor employee behavior and Internet usage. As this surveillance is conducted on company-owned machines and typically during the business day, when an employee is being paid to perform a particular set of tasks, this practice, the official policy in many organizations, is largely recognized as justified. However, while certain organizations surveillance is limited to applications as simple as filtering out social networking sites and private email, some companies go so far as to log all website requests from company computers, or even screenshots and keystroke records. Employers almost unanimously defend these practices as ethical, pointing out their ownership of the machines, and an employee's duty to perform the job for which they are being paid with adequate focus and dedication. However, in response to some of the more stringent surveillance policies, employees not few in number have pointed out that on the occasion that a legitimate reason for personal use of a business machine might arise, an employer may unfairly collect sensitive personal data, such as passwords or the contents of personal emails, even if the personal use is due to an extenuating circumstance.

Another, perhaps more questionable policy is the execution of informal "Google checks" or "Net checks," in which employees are subject to a background check consisting of whatever information the employeer can find on Google, or social networking and blog such as Myspace, Facebook, Blogspot, or LiveJournal. From the employer's point of view, this allows an inspection of the potential employee's character, an examination of what behavior they are comfortable making public to friends or the general public. Legally, this is a viable option, as the Equal Opportunity Employee Act does not forbid frivolous job requirements, so long as they do not discriminate by race, religion, gender, national origin, or a few other criteria. Thus, an employer is free to make a hiring decision based on the content of one's social networking sites, news reports on the internet, or blog posts. Many employers defend the ethical nature of this practice by insisting that the content one chooses to voluntarily put online reflects his or her personality, habits, and morals, any one of which could be an indication of job candidate quality. In their defense, employees reply that their private life, so long as it does not conflict with legality, should be of no concern to their chances of being hired for a job unless it would directly interfere with job performance. In the United States, the law sides with the employers, but the ethical choice is a matter of personal decision.

=School Survailence=
The issues raised by Internet surveillance of students by academic institutions largely parallel those concerned in the matter of employers conducting surveillance on employees. Often, especially in public primary and secondary schools, content is automatically assessed and screened.

=Resources=
==Relevant External Links:==
* [http://boingboing.net/2006/01/31/eff_suing_att_for_he.html EFF suing AT&T for helping NSA]
==Relevant Class Website Links:==
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/web/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/web/]
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/mining/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/mining/]
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/surveillance/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/surveillance/]
* [http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/financial/ http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/privacy/financial/]

CSC 379:Week 1, Group 3

2007-07-13T22:17:24Z

Jjpittar:

== Spam-Blocking Techniques ==
Domain Blocking 
A spam-blocking technique which consists of redirecting to "junk" email boxes or filtering entirely all emails from specific web domains which have been blacklisted for spamming in the past.
*Advantages:
**Domain-level blocking is an easy and cost-effective way to curtail large numbers of email addresses from which spam is sent. The blocking of a single domain can block an infinite number of possible addresses in that domain.
**Blacklists used for domain-level blocking may be shared among numerous email providers, thus protecting subscribers to one service from spam sent to subscribers of any collaborating service.
**As there is typically a fee associated with acquiring a domain, spammers using blocked domains must pay to purchase a new domain if they are blacklisted.
*Disadvantages
**Though purchasing domains is associated with a cost, it is typically a marginal expense and well within the budget of major spammers worldwide. Thus, blocking a domain does little to prevent a spammer from spamming from a different domain.
**Though spam may originate from one address in a domain, blocking the entire domain may result in the blacklisting of multiple addresses of individuals or corporations which have not engaged in spam, and therefore should not have the receipt of their mail blocked.
**When a web domain previously blacklisted changes ownership, the new owners may remain blacklisted due to the actions of the previous owners, and at no fault of their own.
**Much spam is sent through "spoofed" email addresses in which the sending domain is misrepresented. Blocking such a domain may prevent the receipt of email from a domain which is not associated with spam.
**Spam can be sent from "zombie" machines infected by malware which sends spam, but owned by individuals unaware that their machines are engaging in spamming. Blocking the domains of these machines would block the receipt of mail from innocent users.
**Spam, especially spam from "zombie" machines, can come from typically reputable domains with thousands or millions of users. Blocking such domains may degrade the quality of email service provided to a service's users to an unacceptable level. 
Is it Ethical? 
With so many ways to accidentally block non-spamming email addresses, the ethics of domain-level blocking are questionable at best. The goal of blocking spam is to make email more productive by eliminating messages which would clearly be considered "junk" by the vast majority of users. Taking a serious chance on intercepting email from well-intentioned addresses, therefore, runs counter to the goal of making the communications more productive. Perhaps with a feature to unblock specific addresses from a domain and to receive all messages from a "junk" mailbox, this strategy would be more acceptable. In its most basic form, however, the high probability of blocking non-spamming users challenges this method's claim to validity. 
See Also: 
*[http://www.joewein.de/sw/spam-bl-e.htm List of Blacklisted Domains]
*[http://www.blacklistedip.com/ IP Blacklist Monitoring Service]
*[http://ezinearticles.com/?Blocking-Domain-Spam-Senders&id=374858 Article on Spam which Includes Domain Blocking]
 

Prior Approval 
A spam-blocking technique in which a sender must request the permission of either a user or an email provider before mail can be received by that user or a client of that provider. This generally takes one of two forms, either the use of a CAPTCHA ( (C)ompletely (A)utomated (P)ublic (T)uring Test to tell (C)omputers and (H)umans (A)part) which a sender must pass in order for an email to be delivered, or a whitelist, controlled by a recipient, which explicitly states the only addresses from which email is received. 
CAPTCHA Approach
*Advantages:
**Completely eliminates the ability of computer controlled spamming "bots" to send mail to an address.
**Allows all mail from human users who can and will evaluate the CAPTCHA, thereby avoiding forcefully blocking well-intentioned human-sent mail.
**Discourages spam sent from human sources to many addresses, as such sending would involved the evaluation of numerous CAPTCHAs
*Disadvantages:
**For the same reason that this method discourages spam sent from humans to many addresses, it also discourages worthwhile messages sent to many addresses.
**Eliminates or severely hampers the user's ability to receive solicited automated emails.
**Does not strictly eliminate spam from human sources.
**Prevents the receipt of mail from the young, the old, the disabled, or others who may be incapable of evaluating the CAPTCHA
**Depending on the implementation of the system, a sender may not expect to be required to complete a CAPTCHA confirmation, and may assume that his or her message has been sent when it has not.
**Rather than eliminating the burden of wasted time and stress imposed by spam, this approach merely shifts it from the receiver to the sender, and imposes it for all emails rather than just spam. 
**Advancing technology makes designing CAPTCHAs which are one step ahead of computer readability increasingly difficult with time. 
Is it Ethical? 
At face value, the CAPTCHA Prior Approval method for controlling spam seems inherently more ethical than the domain blocking approach. However, this approach, too, has the potential to block solicited emails, both from automated services and from those without the ability, knowledge, expectation, or patience to fill out CAPTCHA forms. It could therefore be argued that this approach unfairly targets and limits the ability of various demographic groups, mentioned above, to send email. However, the biggest ethical challenge to the CAPTCHA approach is to ask what, exactly, it does to eliminate the burdens of spam. After all, the act of eliminating spam is hardly an end in and of itself. The point of all spam-controlling technologies is to save time, stress, and annoyance for the users of email. It could be legitimately argued that this approach, while it does cut down on the number of spam messages received by an address, itself creates the same sort of burdens which spam imposes, and thereby does little or nothing to improve the usability of email. The burden of one spam message is merely the time and effort required to read a subject line, identify a message as spam, and click the "delete" button. The CAPTCHA approach eliminates automated spam, and should be lauded for that fact. However, it isn't too far-fetched to say that more time and effort is required to evaluate and answer a CAPTCHA, sometimes multiple times, depending on a user's skill or experience with the tests, than would be required to delete, en-masse, the spam which would be received if this technique were not used at all. In essence, then, this approach merely shifts the burden of wasted time from recipient to sender, and to force such a waste of time on someone who may be busy, who may be sending an important email, is arguably just as unethical as forcing a recipient to delete messages at a time of his or her own choosing.
 
The Whitelist Approach 
*Advantages:
**Allows a user complete and total control over from whom the user wishes to receive email.
**Completely blocks all unwanted mail from addresses which are not pre-approved.
*Disadvantages:
**Fails to block any unsolicited or unwanted messages from pre-approved addresses.
**Blocks all email from addresses not pre-approved, regardless of content, sender, situation, or potential benefit to the recipient.
**Eliminates the user's ability to receive desired or solicited email from unknown addresses.
Is it Ethical? 
Certainly, it would be difficult to defend the ethical nature of forcing users of an email service to employ a whitelist of approved addresses. Whether for business or personal use, the importance of receiving mail from unknown addresses - friends with new or changed email addresses, business associates, new contacts, new clients, individuals who discovered a business via the web - is undeniable in daily life. This approach may eliminate nearly all spam messages, with the exception of spam from individuals the recipient knows, but in the process it impacts the usability of email overall in a very severe, very negative fashion. For many purposes, if an email address cannot receive mail from unknown addresses, it is entirely useless. This approach essentially elevates the errors of the domain blocking approach to an entirely new level of severity. While it may be valuable for applications such as parental controls and monitoring of children on the Internet, this approach is essentially useless for the purpose of blocking spam alone. To force it on a user is to offer a substandard email service, which may be unethical and is certainly undesirable. That said, however, there seems to be nothing wrong with allowing users to choose a whitelist option for controlling email, should they so desire. For a particular email address with specific uses and only a few potential senders, or for an individual who does not wish to be bothered by any unsolicited email whatsoever and who doesn't mind the hassle of learning of new individuals' email addresses by another means, this is an entirely viable option. It is hardly unethical, of course, for a user to choose to seclude themselves from all but a handful of email addresses voluntarily. 
Note that a combination of the above two approaches eliminates many of the problems posed by each. The use of a CAPTCHA authentication system, along with a whitelist of addresses for which the CAPTCHA is bypassed, is a particularly good solution relative to the others discussed here. In such a scenario, unknown email may be received, but spam is effectively blocked or made time-prohibitive. Many of the problems with the CAPTCHA scheme are addressed, as a CAPTCHA only needs to be completed once, after which an address can be added to a user's whitelist, and unrestricted communication may continue. 
See Also:
 
[http://www.captcha.net/ The CAPTCHA Project] 
[http://www.earthlink.net/software/free/spamblocker/faq/ Earthlink SpamBlocker FAQ - CAPTCHA/Whitelist Approach] 
[http://www.netmanners.com/email-whitelist-etiquette.html Article Explaining and Instructing in the Use of Whitelists]
 
Charge for Sent E-Mail 
A method which consists of levying a fee against the sender of an email for each message sent, akin to the electronic equivalent of a postage stamp 
*Advantages:
**Eliminates the positive revenue of sending spam messages, making their sending an undesirable business practice.
**Provides revenue ostensibly for the upkeep and improvement of email networks
*Disadvantages:
**Could make mass emails cost-prohibitive for individuals who need to send out large numbers of messages, or for non-profit organizations.
**Users who already pay between ten and fifty dollars each month for internet service are likely to react poorly to being told that they have to pay more for emails.
**Raises the cost of internet access in general, making it less affordable to lower-income individuals.
**Logistically, imposing a fee on such a global medium as email would prove difficult if not impossible.
**Distribution, use, and escalation of the fee would probably become an issue in time.
**When spam is sent from zombie machines, not only is the problem of spam not solved by charging for email, but the burden of the "postage" fee for sent spam messages is borne by the unwitting owner of a controlled computer. 
Is it Ethical? 
The ethical nature of imposing a fee for emails is hardly a cut-and-dry question. There does not seem to be anything unethical about charging a reasonable price for a service rendered, and using the revenue from that fee in a responsible manner. However, many would say that it is unethical to charge an exorbitant or excessive fee, or to use the revenue generated by such a fee for irresponsible purposes. Some would argue that current Internet Service Provider charges are already excessive, and that adding a fee for email would only exacerbate an already prevalent problem. One essential question comes down to whether the fee for sent emails is to be used specifically to discourage spam, or whether internet providers might come to rely upon it as another stream of revenue, and as such, seek to maximize the profits they could gain from the fee by consistently raising the price of sending an email. Clearly, the ethics of one use of the fee are an entirely different matter than the ethics of the other. Also, with email being such a pervasive and worldwide phenomenon as it is, the logistics of ethically levying the fee across national boundaries, in various currencies, and in areas where corruption of public office runs rife, becomes a serious issue. It goes without being said that no first-world organization would like to propose a global fee structure which, in another part of the world, might help to finance corrupt leaders, oppressive and inhumane public policies, or terrorism. Thus, the question to whom, ultimately, the revenue of the fee is to be distributed must also be addressed. Also, it would be undesirable for respectable nonprofit organizations to be effectively banned from using mass emails through an inability to afford the necessary postage cost. Additionally, the ethics of this approach are most seriously challenged when the issue of zombied computers is considered. With computers that are hijacked, the approach of charging for email imposes a completely unjust fee on the unwitting owners of controlled machines. However, provided that all of these issues could be settled satisfactorily, that there could be exceptions, as with United States postage, for nonprofit organizations, that the revenues were used ethically and fairly, and that the fee was nominal at most, charging a fee for emails sent does seem to be, when properly handled and without the issue of zombies, an ethical proposal. 
See Also: 
[http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2006/02/email_postage.html AOL to Consider Charging for Emails] 
[http://www.infowars.com/articles/ps/internet_tax_email_tax_is_coming.htm Article on a Possible Email Tax] 
[http://www.snopes.com/business/taxes/bill602p.asp An Email Tax Hoax Exposed]
 
Opt-In for Commercial E-Mail 
A technique in which all commercial senders of email would require for a user to take action to choose to have commercial email sent to their address before they would receive any such mailings. 
*Advantages:
**Eliminates all unsolicited commercial emails.
**Allows the user to receive any commercial emails which he or she may choose.
**Does not limit messages sent for personal or nonprofit use.
*Disadvantages
**Disallows any potentially desirable commercial emails of which the user is not aware.
**Requires that companies use other, typically more expensive media to initially contact potential customers.
Is it Ethical? 
Opt-in commercial mailings eliminate all commercial emails not specifically solicited, and, contrary to all above approaches, do nothing to limit or discourage personal or nonprofit use of email in the process. Perhaps it could be argued that requiring all commercial emails to be opt-in would impose somewhat of a burden on companies, but with the availability of other forms of advertising, especially Internet advertising, this would be a marginal burden at worst, and a small price to pay for the near-total elimination of spam. While there are still some minor issues with this solution, such as the possibility that users might occasionally get a spam message that they end up putting to good use, these such concerns are not exactly ethical in nature, and, all in all, the solution of requiring opt-in lists for commercial emails seems like an ethical way to address the problem of spam. However, in practicality, so-called opt in selections are by set to send emails by default, making them, in fact, the much less-desirable form of an opt-out program.
 
See Also 
[http://www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3499691 Building an Opt-In Email List] 
[http://www.spamhaus.org/mailinglists.html Comparison of Various Opt-In / Opt-Out Programs as Related to Spam] 
[http://www.spambutcher.com/art1/486278/ Commentary on the Ambiguity of "Opt-In" Programs]
 

Domain Authentication 
Domain-authentication technologies are used to ensure that a sender's domain is not forged or "spoofed." (1) 
*Advantages:
**Prevents spammers from hiding their location.
**Allows ISPs and others to hold spammers responsible for their spam.
**Discourages spam and other unethical e-mail.
*Disadvantages
**A standard way of doing domain authentication must be decided on.
**There are several companies that have say in how to do domain authentication, making it harder to reach a concensus.
Is it Ethical? 
Domain authentication would go a long way to helping ISPs and the government to hold the spammers responsible. Right now a spammer can mask their location so in essence they are sending you anonymous emails. After a standard for domain authentication is in place people will be able to see the actual person that sent the email. No more spoofing. This solution takes a little power away from the average emailer, but the ability to spoof is not an ability with any practical and ethical use. 
See Also 
[http://e-com.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/ecic-ceac.nsf/en/gv00298e.html Electronic Commerce in Canada] 
[http://lwn.net/Articles/188685/ Domain Keys for email sender authentication] 
[http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,4149,1430976,00.asp Yahoo Proposes Anti-Spam Standard For Internet]
 

Bounties
There is "a new proposal gaining momentum at the Federal Trade Commission that would award hard-cash bounties to ordinary citizens who help arrest the bane of email marketing today: spam"[http://www.econtentmag.com/Articles/ArticleReader.aspx?CategoryID=3&ArticleID=7616] 
*Advantages
**The average Joe could help find the offending spammers and stop them from filling our mailboxes
**Spammers would be more warry of sending out spam when they know that the person they are sending it to could get a nice reward for turning them in
*Disadvantages
**Greedy vigilanties would begin turning companies that had some technical violation.
**Well meaning companies that fail to meat some small specification my be eaten alive by the piranas that are the general public trying to make some quick cash
Is it Ethical?
I don't think allowing the general public to collect bounties on companies that have made some small technical violation is a good idea. This would greatly hinder business because every small company would have to be experts on the law just to send out a well meaning email to their customers. It might be ok hold the really big businesses to a standard like this but small businesses can't afford to have a lawyer proof-read all of their email that they send out. With the definition of spam being somewhat gray, offering a bounty for anyone who catches spammers is at best going to waste a lot of time looking into these claims. 
See Also 
[http://www.econtentmag.com/Articles/ArticleReader.aspx?CategoryID=3&ArticleID=7616 Spam Bounties: Legitimate Email Marketers at Risk] 
[http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1648051,00.asp Bounties Are Not the Answer to Spam] 
[http://www.technewsworld.com/story/36816.html Laws, Bounties, International Cooperation Fighting Spam]
 

The "Goodmail" Approach
The Goodmail approach is where a company can pay a certain amount to have their emails bypass the spam filters of their customers. The idea is that if a company is willing to pay to send you an email they aren't a scam or some phishing attempt. 
*Advantages
**If each message you send costs a fraction of a cent then the recipient is more likely to get just legitimate email.
**If companies have to pay to send advertising email, then they might worker harder to specifically target their email.
**Companies will also send you mail less frequently if they have to pay for it.
*Disadvantages
**If a company can't afford to pay the fee then they lose a formerly free mode of advertising.
**Nonprofit Organizations would not be able to afford to pay the fee
Is it Ethical? 
The Goodmail approach has very strict guidelines about which applicants they accept based on spam-complaint records. "Goodmail has rejected more than 75% of the companies that have applied for its Certified Email program, according to the company's chief executive, Richard Gingras." [http://www.spamdailynews.com/publish/Goodmail_rejecting_three_quarters_of_applicants.asp] This means that there is a company out there deciding who should and who should not be allowed to send email. This is very unethical in my opinion. They should allow the fee itself to do the talking, if a company wishes to pay the fee then they can bypass the spam filters. This will go a long way to helping ensure the email one gets is legitimate. By allowing the goodmail people to decide who is and isn't allowed to use their service is just asking for corruption. 
See Also 
[http://www.spamdailynews.com/publish/Goodmail_rejecting_three_quarters_of_applicants.asp Goodmail rejecting three quarters of applicants] 
[http://www.spamdailynews.com/publish/Goodmail_CertifiedEmail_will_not_reduce_spam.asp Goodmail: CertifiedEmail will not reduce spam] 
[http://news.com.com/Leading+ISPs+sign+up+for+Goodmail+antispam+service/2100-7355_3-6189298.html Leading ISPs sign up for Goodmail antispam service]
 

Escrow Bonds
A concept which involves email senders to pay an amount to an escrow service, the sum of which is released back to the sender if a message is not marked by the recipient as spam, but is lost if the message is identified as spam. Variations include adding whitelists for which the escrow is bypassed, and blacklists for which the deposit is automatically lost. 
*Advantages:
**Imposes a fee for emails which is only charged in the case of messages identified as spam.
**Makes spam cost-prohibitive while all other emails, commercial or otherwise, remain free.
*Disadvantages:
**Requires the financing of third-party escrow agencies, allowing a new avenue of exploitation of the fee.
**Necessitates an effective online micro-payment system.
**Allows for the charging as spam of any messages marked as spam, perhaps accidentally, falsely, or maliciously, by the recipient.
**Requires that the logistics of independent escrow agencies for all emails sent in any countries be satisfactorily addressed.
Is it Ethical? 
The concept of an independent escrow system for emails does not inherently seem to pose any sort of ethical dilemma. Such a scenario appears to address many of the concerns with the email postage solution, as, in this scheme, all non-spam emails are free. However, while the concept does not pose any ethical concerns in principle, in practice, several problems arise. Mainly, financing of the escrow services could possibly lead to concerns. Multiple tiers of service, high costs, or "preferred" senders who could bypass escrow blacklists with spam could lead to corruption which would be, in all practicality, unethical. 
See Also 
[http://8stars.org/a/2003/03/13/more-on-fighting-spam/ A Spam Escrow Proposal] 
[http://www.si.umich.edu/about-SI/news-detail.htm?NewsItemID=416 University of Michigan Proposal for A Spam Escrow Service] 
[http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Spam%20economics-abm.pdf PDF Presentation on an Economic Bond Solution to Spam]

CSC 379:Week 2, Group 2

2007-07-13T22:07:37Z

Jjpittar:

=GNU General Public License=

==Overview==
"Originally released in 1989, The [http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html GNU General Public License], often called the GNU GPL for short, is a software license used by most [http://www.gnu.org GNU] programs, and by more than half of all free software packages." from the [http://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html#GPL GNU web site] The GPL was created by [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Stallman Richard Stallman] who created the GNU project and a leader in the free software movement. Unlike more permissive licenses which place little restriction on the end use of covered products, the GPL contains specific restrictions and stipulations on GPL-licensed works. Among other things, the current GNU GPL (version 3) mandates...
#That GPL software may be sold for commercial or other profit purposes at any cost...
#That regardless of software cost, a copy of the software package's original source code must be made available for free when any binary versions of GPL software are being distributed...
#That if territorial law prohibits any of the stipulations in the GPL from being upheld, GPL software may not be distributed at all in that locality...
#That a copy of the GPL license be distributed in full with any distributed GPL works...
#That the source code of GPL-covered works may be freely compiled, copied, modified, or improved by anyone...
#That an executable program covered under the GPL may be reproduced freely by anyone...
#That any software which results from modification of GPL work, or of which GPL-covered source code is a portion, must be licensed under the GPL...
#That GPL-licensed software may not be cross-licensed by any means which would restrict the liberties and requirements set in place by the GPL (ie, by a corporate contract, or a more restrictive license)...
#That GPL-licensed software must not be run on a platform which prohibits the running of modified GPL software...
#That no warranty whatsoever be issued for GPL software...
#That works covered under any version of the GPL may be optionally covered under the newest version of the GPL as new versions of the license are released.

==Discussion Questions==

===What is the impact of GPL use?===
**A developer that wishes to release their code free and open source can do so and not worry about future changes of their code ending up in none free propriety software by releasing their code under the GPL. Others can modify and change software to meet their needs, but any thing that is derived from GPL code must again be released under the GPL.
**If a developer wishes to use some code from a GPL project in one of their own, they can not unless the new project will be licensed under the GPL. Some have criticized the GPL in acting like a virus, as it is inherently attached to anything that uses GPL code. A [http://kaybee.org:81/~kirk/GPL.html View] as to why GPL should not be used
**GPL and other open source code licenses allows for many more developers to look and and find bugs and make improvements to software than in proprietary software.
*** The many different distributions of the [http://www.linux.org Linux] operating system are the most popular examples of GPL-licensed work.
*** [http://www.mozilla.com/en-US/ Firefox] and [http://www.openoffice.org OpenOffice.org] are released under the [http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/lesser.html LGPL] or Lesser General Public License

===What are the ethical considerations for licenses like GPL that require their adoption if work licensed under it is incorporated into a parent work, with additional stipulations that include the acceptance of the most current version of the GPL license?===

One of the most controversial aspects of the GPL is the so-called "[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyleft copyleft]" protection which it imposes. Contrary to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright copyright], which forcibly restricts an end user's right to reproduce or modify a covered work, copyleft protection, though the term itself has no official legal meaning, refers to licensing agreements which guarantee that the right to reproduce and modify a work is preserved, often across numerous individuals, modifications, and even independent uses of a product. In essence, copyleft protection is the contractual exclusion of the common rights of copyright. While the ethical issues of copyright are often and thoroughly discussed, the issues surrounding copyleft protection are much less frequently addressed, perhaps due to its lesser prevalence. While the most [http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/philosophy.html adamant proponents] of copyleft protection might like it depicted as the solution for a free and open software market devoid of the injustices of copyright, copyleft protection has its own set of ethical dilemmas, independent of but not less significant than its better-known counterpart. 
In the form present in the GPL license, copyleft protection stipulates that any modification of a GPL-covered work must also be covered under the GPL. However, it also stipulates that any work in which GPL-covered code is included must itself, in entirety, be licensed under the GPL. Thus, in theory, if a developer were to write a program containing several million lines of source code, and were to include a GPL-covered algorithm in ten such lines, then the entire program, not just the portion which had been previously covered by the GPL, would now be GPL software. As such, though the developer might have been planning to rely upon this product for his or her livelihood, and even though he or she independently created well over 99% of the program in question without any GPL code, he or she would now be forced to release all such code for free, and to allow for the free copying of the entire program. Thus, the GPL is ideal for initial developers of a program who wish to guarantee that their work remains free, readily improvable, and is not used for proprietary purposes in the future. For those who wish to contribute to future free software projects, too, the GPL provides a means of ensuring the intended use of software and libraries. However, in one sense, the GPL essentially renders all covered programs useless for any purposes related to profit. Though large corporations such as Red Hat have profited significantly off of GPL-licensed software, it is legitimately arguable that such profit is not from the software itself - which is freely available for download - but from the increased ease with which it can be rapidly distributed from Red Hat's installation media, or from the tech support which the company provides. Any programmer needing any guaranteed profit from a work is effectively barred from using any GPL-licensed code, as to do so would have a significantly negative impact on the author's ability to control reproduction of his or her work. Additionally, GPL projects may incorporate stipulations which require that, as the GPL is updated, the newest version of the license is automatically adopted.
 
Ethically, the implications of this copyleft phenomenon can be examined from a number of perspectives. For the end user, the right to freely redistribute and, with the right expertise, modify, improve, or customize software is a great improvement over purchasing a program and being required to use it in a limited fashion. For the developer, however, the advantages are more mixed. If the developer is starting on a project and wishes it to remain forever free to redistribute, then the GPL serves that function. Too, for the developer who wishes to improve upon a GPL project, the license ensures that his or her contribution will not be misused. For the developer implementing an existing or independent project with the help of any GPL code, though, the implications are much less positive. From this perspective, the restrictions which copyleft places on the developer are quite as restrictive as those which copyright places on the end user. While the developer of the GPL code should ethically have the right to decide how his code is used, the question becomes a bit more ambiguous when the language of the GPL is perused. Due to the conditions of the GPL, this developer is essentially given the right to forcibly dictate how another larger product is licensed if a GPL product is at all contributory. In effect, the developer who contributed the vast majority of the effort to his independent project loses the right to dictate his or her own license terms due to a perhaps trivial amount of GPL code. In such way, many have argued, the GPL dictatorially [http://www.cons.org/cracauer/gpl.html forces itself] on developers. Additionally, if the GPL code included requires the adoption of newer license versions as they become available, then the developer, in including the GPL product in his own, essentially agrees to have distribution of the overarching product controlled by an open-ended licensing agreement, the stipulations of which are only temporarily known. 
In essence, then, the GPL is an excellent for any software project released with the primary intention of benefiting the computing community. For any project in which profit is a must, however, it most likely should not be employed. The obvious, though unpleasant, solution is to The question of whether forced copyleft protection is ethical is one perhaps without a definitive answer. While the GPL developer has the right to determine how his code should be used and therefore should have the right to limit the use of his code in any proprietary project, the independent developer should likewise retain the right to determine the use of his code. However, this is not the case with the GPL. Whether this is an ethical stance depends entirely on whether the rights of the free-software or the proprietary-software developer are favored, and the question is therefore not a cut-and-dry issue with explicit right and wrong answers. The GPL, too, allows for profit, yet by requiring the release of source code, it restricts the potential to profit only to those unable or unwilling to build working working binaries of a program for themselves. It could be therefore said that the GPL does not in fact allow for profit, except from circumstances of ignorance or laziness, which few would consider ethical. If the free use of GPL code were truly the aim of the license, then some might say that more permissive terms, which allow for non-redistributable but still open-source projects, as well as for freely redistributable projects, are in order. Then, a developer could make the choice free of the duress of the current GPL conditions, and the code from the GPL would benefit end users either way, while a developer would retain the option of guaranteed profit on the use of his or her product. 
In the ideal, projects which incorporated code licensed under the GPL would give both the GPL-covered author and the independent author concurrent power to decide the license terms of a product, each over the portion of the product for which each respective individual was the author. To this aim, the LGPL, or Lesser GNU Public License, was composed. Simplistically, code licensed under the LGPL may be used in independent for-profit products without instating the requirement that the entire overarching project be distributed for free. LGPL code may be included in a project as a linked library, and while the library itself must be treated in very similar fashion to a project licensed under the GPL, the license for the remaining independent project is left much more (though not entirely) to the discretion of the independent developer. Thus, the LGPL developer, unlike the GPL developer, is not given undue power over the product of the time and effort of the proprietary developer. The LGPL therefore exists as a compromise between the high-minded ideals of the GPL and the economic realities of society, in which even software developers must earn a living. This compromise addresses many of the issues considered possibly unethical surrounding the copyleft protection of the GPL. However, the intent of the GPL, to provide free and unrestricted access to software so that all can benefit and contribute, is in many opinions far more ethical than the profiteering schemes prevalent in much of the rest of the software market.

===An Examination of a Recent Related Event: The Microsoft/Novell partnership===

Recently [http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2006/nov06/11-02MSNovellPR.mspx Microsoft partnered with their rival Novell], the makers of Suse Linux, in an effort to optimize virtualization for each other's operating systems, among other promised features. Since Suse Linux is covered under the GNU General Public License, this raised some unique concerns. GPL licenses specify that source code is available for free and can be freely modified and redistributed (given you adhere to the other stipulations of the GPL), however, Microsoft is paying a royalty to Novell to use and modify their products. Even though legally this agreement is valid, many developers who have contributed their work to Suse over the years with the understanding that it would be covered under the GPL feel betrayed by this and consider it a breach of the agreement.

Another ethical dilemma arises when one considers that the GPL agreement included patent protection for Novell customers only if Microsoft's intellectual property was discovered in Linux. However, Novell has not yet officially acknowledged that Linux infringes on Microsoft's patents.

Some argue that an agreement to make operating systems better optimized for one another as the demand for servers to run multiple operating systems increases can only be beneficial to customers, companies and the development community as a whole.

You can read more about the announcement, reactions and criticism at these external links:
*[http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html GNU Agreement which covers all of Suse Linux]
*[http://news.com.com/Microsoft+makes+Linux+pact+with+Novell/2100-1016_3-6132119.html The Announcement]
*[http://techp.org/petition/show/1 Reaction from some GNU Software Developers]

CSC 379:Week 2, Group 2

2007-07-13T21:31:17Z

Jjpittar:

=GNU General Public License=

==Overview==
"Originally released in 1989, The [http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html GNU General Public License], often called the GNU GPL for short, is a software license used by most [http://www.gnu.org GNU] programs, and by more than half of all free software packages." from the [http://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html#GPL GNU web site] The GPL was created by [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Stallman Richard Stallman] who created the GNU project and a leader in the free software movement. Unlike more permissive licenses which place little restriction on the end use of covered products, the GPL contains specific restrictions and stipulations on GPL-licensed works. Among other things, the current GNU GPL (version 3) mandates...
#That GPL software may be sold for commercial or other profit purposes at any cost...
#That regardless of software cost, a copy of the software package's original source code must be made available for free when any binary versions of GPL software are being distributed...
#That if territorial law prohibits any of the stipulations in the GPL from being upheld, GPL software may not be distributed at all in that locality...
#That a copy of the GPL license be distributed in full with any distributed GPL works...
#That the source code of GPL-covered works may be freely compiled, copied, modified, or improved by anyone...
#That an executable program covered under the GPL may be reproduced freely by anyone...
#That any software which results from modification of GPL work, or of which GPL-covered source code is a portion, must be licensed under the GPL...
#That GPL-licensed software may not be cross-licensed by any means which would restrict the liberties and requirements set in place by the GPL (ie, by a corporate contract, or a more restrictive license)...
#That GPL-licensed software must not be run on a platform which prohibits the running of modified GPL software...
#That no warranty whatsoever be issued for GPL software...
#That works covered under any version of the GPL may be optionally covered under the newest version of the GPL as new versions of the license are released.

==Discussion Questions==

===What is the impact of GPL use?===
**A developer that wishes to release their code free and open source can do so and not worry about future changes of their code ending up in none free propriety software by releasing their code under the GPL. Others can modify and change software to meet their needs, but any thing that is derived from GPL code must again be released under the GPL.
**If a developer wishes to use some code from a GPL project in one of their own, they can not unless the new project will be licensed under the GPL. Some have criticized the GPL in acting like a virus, as it is inherently attached to anything that uses GPL code. A [http://kaybee.org:81/~kirk/GPL.html View] as to why GPL should not be used
**GPL and other open source code licenses allows for many more developers to look and and find bugs and make improvements to software than in proprietary software.
*** The many different distributions of the Linux operating system are the most popular example of a GPL-licensed work.
*** Firefox and Open Office are released under the [http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/lesser.html LGPL] or Lesser General Public License

===What are the ethical considerations for licenses like GPL that require their adoption if work licensed under it is incorporated into a parent work, with additional stipulations that include the acceptance of the most current version of the GPL license?===

One of the most controversial aspects of the GPL is the so-called "copyleft" protection which it imposes. Contrary to copyright, which forcibly restricts an end user's right to reproduce or modify a covered work, copyleft protection, though the term itself has no official legal meaning, refers to licensing agreements which guarantee that the right to reproduce and modify a work is preserved, often across numerous individuals, modifications, and even independent uses of a product. In essence, copyleft protection is the contractual exclusion of the common rights of copyright. While the ethical issues of copyright are often and thoroughly discussed, perhaps due to its lesser prevalence, the issues surrounding copyleft protection are much less frequently addressed. While the most adamant proponents of copyleft protection might like it depicted as the solution for a free and open software market devoid of the injustices of copyright, copyleft protection has its own set of ethical dilemmas, independent of but not less significant than its better-known counterpart. 
In the form present in the GPL license, copyleft protection stipulates that any modification of a GPL-covered work must also be covered under the GPL. However, it also stipulates that any work in which GPL-covered code is included must itself, in entirety, be licensed under the GPL. Thus, in theory, if a developer were to write a program containing several million lines of source code, and were to include a GPL-covered algorithm in ten such lines, then the entire program, not just the portion which had been previously covered by the GPL, would now be GPL software. As such, though the developer might have been planning to rely upon this product for his or her livelihood, and even though he or she independently created well over 99% of the program in question without any GPL code, he or she would now be forced to release all such code for free, and to allow for the free copying of the entire program. Thus, the GPL is ideal for initial developers of a program who wish to guarantee that their work remains free, readily improvable, and is not used for proprietary purposes in the future. For those who wish to contribute to future free software projects, too, the GPL provides a means of ensuring the intended use of software and libraries. However, in one sense, the GPL essentially renders all covered programs useless for any purposes related to profit. Though large corporations such as Red Hat have profited significantly off of GPL-licensed software, it is legitimately arguable that such profit is not from the software itself - which is freely available for download - but from the increased ease with which it can be rapidly distributed from Red Hat's installation media, or from the tech support which the company provides. Any programmer needing any guaranteed profit from a work is effectively barred from using any GPL-licensed code, as to do so would have a significantly negative impact on the author's ability to control reproduction of his or her work. Additionally, GPL projects may incorporate stipulations which require that, as the GPL is updated, the newest version of the license is automatically adopted.
 
Ethically, the implications of this copyleft phenomenon can be examined from a number of perspectives. For the end user, the right to freely redistribute and, with the right expertise, modify, improve, or customize software is a great improvement over purchasing a program and being required to use it in a limited fashion. For the developer, however, the advantages are more mixed. If the developer is starting on a project and wishes it to remain forever free to redistribute, then the GPL serves that function. Too, for the developer who wishes to improve upon a GPL project, the license ensures that his or her contribution will not be misused. For the developer implementing an existing or independent project with the help of any GPL code, though, the implications are much less positive. From this perspective, the restrictions which copyleft places on the developer are quite as restrictive as those which copyright places on the end user. While the developer of the GPL code should ethically have the right to decide how his code is used, the question becomes a bit more ambiguous when, due to the conditions of the GPL, this developer is essentially given the right, though use of his code, to dictate how another product is licensed, to which the GPL product contributed only minimally. In effect, the developer who contributed the vast majority of the effort to his independent project loses the right to dictate his or her own license terms due to a perhaps trivial amount of GPL code. Additionally, if the GPL code included requires the adoption of newer license versions as they become available, then the developer, in including the GPL product in his own, essentially agrees to have distribution of the overarching product controlled by an open-ended licensing agreement, the stipulations of which are only temporarily known. 
In essence, then, the GPL is an excellent for any software project released with the primary intention of benefiting the computing community. For any project in which profit is a must, however, it most likely should not be employed. The question of whether forced copyleft protection is ethical is one perhaps without a definitive answer. While the GPL developer has the right to determine how his code should be used and therefore should have the right to limit the use of his code in any proprietary project, the independent developer should likewise retain the right to determine the use of his code. However, this is not the case with the GPL. Whether this is an ethical stance depends entirely on whether the rights of the free-software or the proprietary-software developer are favored, and the question is therefore not a cut-and-dry issue with explicit right and wrong answers. The GPL, too, allows for profit, yet by requiring the release of source code, it restricts the potential to profit only to those unable or unwilling to build working working binaries of a program for themselves. It could be therefore said that the GPL does not in fact allow for profit, except from circumstances of ignorance or laziness, which few would consider ethical. If the free use of GPL code were truly the aim of the license, then some might say that more permissive terms, which allow for non-redistributable but still open-source projects, as well as for freely redistributable projects, are in order. Then, a developer could make the choice free of the duress of the current GPL conditions, and the code from the GPL would benefit end users either way, while a developer would retain the option of guaranteed profit on the use of his or her product. 
In the ideal, projects which incorporated code licensed under the GPL would give both the GPL-covered author and the independent author concurrent power to decide the license terms of a product, each over the portion of the product for which each respective individual was the author. To this aim, the LGPL, or Lesser GNU Public License, was composed. Simplistically, code licensed under the LGPL may be used in independent for-profit products without instating the requirement that the entire overarching project be distributed for free. LGPL code may be included in a project as a linked library, and while the library itself must be treated in very similar fashion to a project licensed under the GPL, the license for the remaining independent project is left much more (though not entirely) to the discretion of the independent developer. Thus, the LGPL developer, unlike the GPL developer, is not given undue power over the product of the time and effort of the proprietary developer. The LGPL therefore exists as a compromise between the high-minded ideals of the GPL and the economic realities of society, in which even software developers must earn a living. This compromise addresses many of the issues considered possibly unethical surrounding the copyleft protection of the GPL. However, the intent of the GPL, to provide free and unrestricted access to software so that all can benefit and contribute, is in many opinions far more ethical than the profiteering schemes prevalent in much of the rest of the software market.

===An Examination of a Recent Related Event: The Microsoft/Novell partnership===

Recently [http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2006/nov06/11-02MSNovellPR.mspx Microsoft partnered with their rival Novell], the makers of Suse Linux, in an effort to optimize virtualization for each other's operating systems, among other promised features. Since Suse Linux is covered under the GNU General Public License, this raised some unique concerns. GPL licenses specify that source code is available for free and can be freely modified and redistributed (given you adhere to the other stipulations of the GPL), however, Microsoft is paying a royalty to Novell to use and modify their products. Even though legally this agreement is valid, many developers who have contributed their work to Suse over the years with the understanding that it would be covered under the GPL feel betrayed by this and consider it a breach of the agreement.

Another ethical dilemma arises when one considers that the GPL agreement included patent protection for Novell customers only if Microsoft's intellectual property was discovered in Linux. However, Novell has not yet officially acknowledged that Linux infringes on Microsoft's patents.

Some argue that an agreement to make operating systems better optimized for one another as the demand for servers to run multiple operating systems increases can only be beneficial to customers, companies and the development community as a whole.

You can read more about the announcement, reactions and criticism at these external links:
*[http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html GNU Agreement which covers all of Suse Linux]
*[http://news.com.com/Microsoft+makes+Linux+pact+with+Novell/2100-1016_3-6132119.html The Announcement]
*[http://techp.org/petition/show/1 Reaction from some GNU Software Developers]

CSC 379:Week 2, Group 2

2007-07-13T21:30:41Z

Jjpittar:

=GNU General Public License=

==Overview==
"Originally released in 1989, The [http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html GNU General Public License], often called the GNU GPL for short, is a software license used by most [http:\\www.gnu.org GNU] programs, and by more than half of all free software packages." from the [http://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html#GPL GNU web site] The GPL was created by [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Stallman Richard Stallman] who created the GNU project and a leader in the free software movement. Unlike more permissive licenses which place little restriction on the end use of covered products, the GPL contains specific restrictions and stipulations on GPL-licensed works. Among other things, the current GNU GPL (version 3) mandates...
#That GPL software may be sold for commercial or other profit purposes at any cost...
#That regardless of software cost, a copy of the software package's original source code must be made available for free when any binary versions of GPL software are being distributed...
#That if territorial law prohibits any of the stipulations in the GPL from being upheld, GPL software may not be distributed at all in that locality...
#That a copy of the GPL license be distributed in full with any distributed GPL works...
#That the source code of GPL-covered works may be freely compiled, copied, modified, or improved by anyone...
#That an executable program covered under the GPL may be reproduced freely by anyone...
#That any software which results from modification of GPL work, or of which GPL-covered source code is a portion, must be licensed under the GPL...
#That GPL-licensed software may not be cross-licensed by any means which would restrict the liberties and requirements set in place by the GPL (ie, by a corporate contract, or a more restrictive license)...
#That GPL-licensed software must not be run on a platform which prohibits the running of modified GPL software...
#That no warranty whatsoever be issued for GPL software...
#That works covered under any version of the GPL may be optionally covered under the newest version of the GPL as new versions of the license are released.

==Discussion Questions==

===What is the impact of GPL use?===
**A developer that wishes to release their code free and open source can do so and not worry about future changes of their code ending up in none free propriety software by releasing their code under the GPL. Others can modify and change software to meet their needs, but any thing that is derived from GPL code must again be released under the GPL.
**If a developer wishes to use some code from a GPL project in one of their own, they can not unless the new project will be licensed under the GPL. Some have criticized the GPL in acting like a virus, as it is inherently attached to anything that uses GPL code. A [http://kaybee.org:81/~kirk/GPL.html View] as to why GPL should not be used
**GPL and other open source code licenses allows for many more developers to look and and find bugs and make improvements to software than in proprietary software.
*** The many different distributions of the Linux operating system are the most popular example of a GPL-licensed work.
*** Firefox and Open Office are released under the [http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/lesser.html LGPL] or Lesser General Public License

===What are the ethical considerations for licenses like GPL that require their adoption if work licensed under it is incorporated into a parent work, with additional stipulations that include the acceptance of the most current version of the GPL license?===

One of the most controversial aspects of the GPL is the so-called "copyleft" protection which it imposes. Contrary to copyright, which forcibly restricts an end user's right to reproduce or modify a covered work, copyleft protection, though the term itself has no official legal meaning, refers to licensing agreements which guarantee that the right to reproduce and modify a work is preserved, often across numerous individuals, modifications, and even independent uses of a product. In essence, copyleft protection is the contractual exclusion of the common rights of copyright. While the ethical issues of copyright are often and thoroughly discussed, perhaps due to its lesser prevalence, the issues surrounding copyleft protection are much less frequently addressed. While the most adamant proponents of copyleft protection might like it depicted as the solution for a free and open software market devoid of the injustices of copyright, copyleft protection has its own set of ethical dilemmas, independent of but not less significant than its better-known counterpart. 
In the form present in the GPL license, copyleft protection stipulates that any modification of a GPL-covered work must also be covered under the GPL. However, it also stipulates that any work in which GPL-covered code is included must itself, in entirety, be licensed under the GPL. Thus, in theory, if a developer were to write a program containing several million lines of source code, and were to include a GPL-covered algorithm in ten such lines, then the entire program, not just the portion which had been previously covered by the GPL, would now be GPL software. As such, though the developer might have been planning to rely upon this product for his or her livelihood, and even though he or she independently created well over 99% of the program in question without any GPL code, he or she would now be forced to release all such code for free, and to allow for the free copying of the entire program. Thus, the GPL is ideal for initial developers of a program who wish to guarantee that their work remains free, readily improvable, and is not used for proprietary purposes in the future. For those who wish to contribute to future free software projects, too, the GPL provides a means of ensuring the intended use of software and libraries. However, in one sense, the GPL essentially renders all covered programs useless for any purposes related to profit. Though large corporations such as Red Hat have profited significantly off of GPL-licensed software, it is legitimately arguable that such profit is not from the software itself - which is freely available for download - but from the increased ease with which it can be rapidly distributed from Red Hat's installation media, or from the tech support which the company provides. Any programmer needing any guaranteed profit from a work is effectively barred from using any GPL-licensed code, as to do so would have a significantly negative impact on the author's ability to control reproduction of his or her work. Additionally, GPL projects may incorporate stipulations which require that, as the GPL is updated, the newest version of the license is automatically adopted.
 
Ethically, the implications of this copyleft phenomenon can be examined from a number of perspectives. For the end user, the right to freely redistribute and, with the right expertise, modify, improve, or customize software is a great improvement over purchasing a program and being required to use it in a limited fashion. For the developer, however, the advantages are more mixed. If the developer is starting on a project and wishes it to remain forever free to redistribute, then the GPL serves that function. Too, for the developer who wishes to improve upon a GPL project, the license ensures that his or her contribution will not be misused. For the developer implementing an existing or independent project with the help of any GPL code, though, the implications are much less positive. From this perspective, the restrictions which copyleft places on the developer are quite as restrictive as those which copyright places on the end user. While the developer of the GPL code should ethically have the right to decide how his code is used, the question becomes a bit more ambiguous when, due to the conditions of the GPL, this developer is essentially given the right, though use of his code, to dictate how another product is licensed, to which the GPL product contributed only minimally. In effect, the developer who contributed the vast majority of the effort to his independent project loses the right to dictate his or her own license terms due to a perhaps trivial amount of GPL code. Additionally, if the GPL code included requires the adoption of newer license versions as they become available, then the developer, in including the GPL product in his own, essentially agrees to have distribution of the overarching product controlled by an open-ended licensing agreement, the stipulations of which are only temporarily known. 
In essence, then, the GPL is an excellent for any software project released with the primary intention of benefiting the computing community. For any project in which profit is a must, however, it most likely should not be employed. The question of whether forced copyleft protection is ethical is one perhaps without a definitive answer. While the GPL developer has the right to determine how his code should be used and therefore should have the right to limit the use of his code in any proprietary project, the independent developer should likewise retain the right to determine the use of his code. However, this is not the case with the GPL. Whether this is an ethical stance depends entirely on whether the rights of the free-software or the proprietary-software developer are favored, and the question is therefore not a cut-and-dry issue with explicit right and wrong answers. The GPL, too, allows for profit, yet by requiring the release of source code, it restricts the potential to profit only to those unable or unwilling to build working working binaries of a program for themselves. It could be therefore said that the GPL does not in fact allow for profit, except from circumstances of ignorance or laziness, which few would consider ethical. If the free use of GPL code were truly the aim of the license, then some might say that more permissive terms, which allow for non-redistributable but still open-source projects, as well as for freely redistributable projects, are in order. Then, a developer could make the choice free of the duress of the current GPL conditions, and the code from the GPL would benefit end users either way, while a developer would retain the option of guaranteed profit on the use of his or her product. 
In the ideal, projects which incorporated code licensed under the GPL would give both the GPL-covered author and the independent author concurrent power to decide the license terms of a product, each over the portion of the product for which each respective individual was the author. To this aim, the LGPL, or Lesser GNU Public License, was composed. Simplistically, code licensed under the LGPL may be used in independent for-profit products without instating the requirement that the entire overarching project be distributed for free. LGPL code may be included in a project as a linked library, and while the library itself must be treated in very similar fashion to a project licensed under the GPL, the license for the remaining independent project is left much more (though not entirely) to the discretion of the independent developer. Thus, the LGPL developer, unlike the GPL developer, is not given undue power over the product of the time and effort of the proprietary developer. The LGPL therefore exists as a compromise between the high-minded ideals of the GPL and the economic realities of society, in which even software developers must earn a living. This compromise addresses many of the issues considered possibly unethical surrounding the copyleft protection of the GPL. However, the intent of the GPL, to provide free and unrestricted access to software so that all can benefit and contribute, is in many opinions far more ethical than the profiteering schemes prevalent in much of the rest of the software market.

===An Examination of a Recent Related Event: The Microsoft/Novell partnership===

Recently [http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2006/nov06/11-02MSNovellPR.mspx Microsoft partnered with their rival Novell], the makers of Suse Linux, in an effort to optimize virtualization for each other's operating systems, among other promised features. Since Suse Linux is covered under the GNU General Public License, this raised some unique concerns. GPL licenses specify that source code is available for free and can be freely modified and redistributed (given you adhere to the other stipulations of the GPL), however, Microsoft is paying a royalty to Novell to use and modify their products. Even though legally this agreement is valid, many developers who have contributed their work to Suse over the years with the understanding that it would be covered under the GPL feel betrayed by this and consider it a breach of the agreement.

Another ethical dilemma arises when one considers that the GPL agreement included patent protection for Novell customers only if Microsoft's intellectual property was discovered in Linux. However, Novell has not yet officially acknowledged that Linux infringes on Microsoft's patents.

Some argue that an agreement to make operating systems better optimized for one another as the demand for servers to run multiple operating systems increases can only be beneficial to customers, companies and the development community as a whole.

You can read more about the announcement, reactions and criticism at these external links:
*[http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html GNU Agreement which covers all of Suse Linux]
*[http://news.com.com/Microsoft+makes+Linux+pact+with+Novell/2100-1016_3-6132119.html The Announcement]
*[http://techp.org/petition/show/1 Reaction from some GNU Software Developers]

CSC 379:Week 2, Group 2

2007-07-13T21:28:40Z

Jjpittar:

=GNU General Public License=

==Overview==
"Originally released in 1989, The GNU General Public License, often called the GNU GPL for short, is a software license used by most GNU programs, and by more than half of all free software packages." from the [http://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html#GPL GNU web site] The GPL was created by [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Stallman Richard Stallman] who created the GNU project and a leader in the free software movement. Unlike more permissive licenses which place little restriction on the end use of covered products, the GPL contains specific restrictions and stipulations on GPL-licensed works. Among other things, the current GNU GPL (version 3) mandates...
#That GPL software may be sold for commercial or other profit purposes at any cost...
#That regardless of software cost, a copy of the software package's original source code must be made available for free when any binary versions of GPL software are being distributed...
#That if territorial law prohibits any of the stipulations in the GPL from being upheld, GPL software may not be distributed at all in that locality...
#That a copy of the GPL license be distributed in full with any distributed GPL works...
#That the source code of GPL-covered works may be freely compiled, copied, modified, or improved by anyone...
#That an executable program covered under the GPL may be reproduced freely by anyone...
#That any software which results from modification of GPL work, or of which GPL-covered source code is a portion, must be licensed under the GPL...
#That GPL-licensed software may not be cross-licensed by any means which would restrict the liberties and requirements set in place by the GPL (ie, by a corporate contract, or a more restrictive license)...
#That GPL-licensed software must not be run on a platform which prohibits the running of modified GPL software...
#That no warranty whatsoever be issued for GPL software...
#That works covered under any version of the GPL may be optionally covered under the newest version of the GPL as new versions of the license are released.
==Discussion Questions==

===What is the impact of GPL use?===
**A developer that wishes to release their code free and open source can do so and not worry about future changes of their code ending up in none free propriety software by releasing their code under the GPL. Others can modify and change software to meet their needs, but any thing that is derived from GPL code must again be released under the GPL.
**If a developer wishes to use some code from a GPL project in one of their own, they can not unless the new project will be licensed under the GPL. Some have criticized the GPL in acting like a virus, as it is inherently attached to anything that uses GPL code. A [http://kaybee.org:81/~kirk/GPL.html View] as to why GPL should not be used
**GPL and other open source code licenses allows for many more developers to look and and find bugs and make improvements to software than in proprietary software.
*** The many different distributions of the Linux operating system are the most popular example of a GPL-licensed work.
*** Firefox and Open Office are released under the [http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/lesser.html LGPL] or Lesser General Public License

===What are the ethical considerations for licenses like GPL that require their adoption if work licensed under it is incorporated into a parent work, with additional stipulations that include the acceptance of the most current version of the GPL license?===

One of the most controversial aspects of the GPL is the so-called "copyleft" protection which it imposes. Contrary to copyright, which forcibly restricts an end user's right to reproduce or modify a covered work, copyleft protection, though the term itself has no official legal meaning, refers to licensing agreements which guarantee that the right to reproduce and modify a work is preserved, often across numerous individuals, modifications, and even independent uses of a product. In essence, copyleft protection is the contractual exclusion of the common rights of copyright. While the ethical issues of copyright are often and thoroughly discussed, perhaps due to its lesser prevalence, the issues surrounding copyleft protection are much less frequently addressed. While the most adamant proponents of copyleft protection might like it depicted as the solution for a free and open software market devoid of the injustices of copyright, copyleft protection has its own set of ethical dilemmas, independent of but not less significant than its better-known counterpart. 
In the form present in the GPL license, copyleft protection stipulates that any modification of a GPL-covered work must also be covered under the GPL. However, it also stipulates that any work in which GPL-covered code is included must itself, in entirety, be licensed under the GPL. Thus, in theory, if a developer were to write a program containing several million lines of source code, and were to include a GPL-covered algorithm in ten such lines, then the entire program, not just the portion which had been previously covered by the GPL, would now be GPL software. As such, though the developer might have been planning to rely upon this product for his or her livelihood, and even though he or she independently created well over 99% of the program in question without any GPL code, he or she would now be forced to release all such code for free, and to allow for the free copying of the entire program. Thus, the GPL is ideal for initial developers of a program who wish to guarantee that their work remains free, readily improvable, and is not used for proprietary purposes in the future. For those who wish to contribute to future free software projects, too, the GPL provides a means of ensuring the intended use of software and libraries. However, in one sense, the GPL essentially renders all covered programs useless for any purposes related to profit. Though large corporations such as Red Hat have profited significantly off of GPL-licensed software, it is legitimately arguable that such profit is not from the software itself - which is freely available for download - but from the increased ease with which it can be rapidly distributed from Red Hat's installation media, or from the tech support which the company provides. Any programmer needing any guaranteed profit from a work is effectively barred from using any GPL-licensed code, as to do so would have a significantly negative impact on the author's ability to control reproduction of his or her work. Additionally, GPL projects may incorporate stipulations which require that, as the GPL is updated, the newest version of the license is automatically adopted.
 
Ethically, the implications of this copyleft phenomenon can be examined from a number of perspectives. For the end user, the right to freely redistribute and, with the right expertise, modify, improve, or customize software is a great improvement over purchasing a program and being required to use it in a limited fashion. For the developer, however, the advantages are more mixed. If the developer is starting on a project and wishes it to remain forever free to redistribute, then the GPL serves that function. Too, for the developer who wishes to improve upon a GPL project, the license ensures that his or her contribution will not be misused. For the developer implementing an existing or independent project with the help of any GPL code, though, the implications are much less positive. From this perspective, the restrictions which copyleft places on the developer are quite as restrictive as those which copyright places on the end user. While the developer of the GPL code should ethically have the right to decide how his code is used, the question becomes a bit more ambiguous when, due to the conditions of the GPL, this developer is essentially given the right, though use of his code, to dictate how another product is licensed, to which the GPL product contributed only minimally. In effect, the developer who contributed the vast majority of the effort to his independent project loses the right to dictate his or her own license terms due to a perhaps trivial amount of GPL code. Additionally, if the GPL code included requires the adoption of newer license versions as they become available, then the developer, in including the GPL product in his own, essentially agrees to have distribution of the overarching product controlled by an open-ended licensing agreement, the stipulations of which are only temporarily known. 
In essence, then, the GPL is an excellent for any software project released with the primary intention of benefiting the computing community. For any project in which profit is a must, however, it most likely should not be employed. The question of whether forced copyleft protection is ethical is one perhaps without a definitive answer. While the GPL developer has the right to determine how his code should be used and therefore should have the right to limit the use of his code in any proprietary project, the independent developer should likewise retain the right to determine the use of his code. However, this is not the case with the GPL. Whether this is an ethical stance depends entirely on whether the rights of the free-software or the proprietary-software developer are favored, and the question is therefore not a cut-and-dry issue with explicit right and wrong answers. The GPL, too, allows for profit, yet by requiring the release of source code, it restricts the potential to profit only to those unable or unwilling to build working working binaries of a program for themselves. It could be therefore said that the GPL does not in fact allow for profit, except from circumstances of ignorance or laziness, which few would consider ethical. If the free use of GPL code were truly the aim of the license, then some might say that more permissive terms, which allow for non-redistributable but still open-source projects, as well as for freely redistributable projects, are in order. Then, a developer could make the choice free of the duress of the current GPL conditions, and the code from the GPL would benefit end users either way, while a developer would retain the option of guaranteed profit on the use of his or her product. 
In the ideal, projects which incorporated code licensed under the GPL would give both the GPL-covered author and the independent author concurrent power to decide the license terms of a product, each over the portion of the product for which each respective individual was the author. To this aim, the LGPL, or Lesser GNU Public License, was composed. Simplistically, code licensed under the LGPL may be used in independent for-profit products without instating the requirement that the entire overarching project be distributed for free. LGPL code may be included in a project as a linked library, and while the library itself must be treated in very similar fashion to a project licensed under the GPL, the license for the remaining independent project is left much more (though not entirely) to the discretion of the independent developer. Thus, the LGPL developer, unlike the GPL developer, is not given undue power over the product of the time and effort of the proprietary developer. The LGPL therefore exists as a compromise between the high-minded ideals of the GPL and the economic realities of society, in which even software developers must earn a living. This compromise addresses many of the issues considered possibly unethical surrounding the copyleft protection of the GPL. However, the intent of the GPL, to provide free and unrestricted access to software so that all can benefit and contribute, is in many opinions far more ethical than the profiteering schemes prevalent in much of the rest of the software market.

===An Examination of a Recent Related Event: The Microsoft/Novell partnership===

Recently [http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2006/nov06/11-02MSNovellPR.mspx Microsoft partnered with their rival Novell], the makers of Suse Linux, in an effort to optimize virtualization for each other's operating systems, among other promised features. Since Suse Linux is covered under the GNU General Public License, this raised some unique concerns. GPL licenses specify that source code is available for free and can be freely modified and redistributed (given you adhere to the other stipulations of the GPL), however, Microsoft is paying a royalty to Novell to use and modify their products. Even though legally this agreement is valid, many developers who have contributed their work to Suse over the years with the understanding that it would be covered under the GPL feel betrayed by this and consider it a breach of the agreement.

Another ethical dilemma arises when one considers that the GPL agreement included patent protection for Novell customers only if Microsoft's intellectual property was discovered in Linux. However, Novell has not yet officially acknowledged that Linux infringes on Microsoft's patents.

Some argue that an agreement to make operating systems better optimized for one another as the demand for servers to run multiple operating systems increases can only be beneficial to customers, companies and the development community as a whole.

You can read more about the announcement, reactions and criticism at these external links:
*[http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html GNU Agreement which covers all of Suse Linux]
*[http://news.com.com/Microsoft+makes+Linux+pact+with+Novell/2100-1016_3-6132119.html The Announcement]
*[http://techp.org/petition/show/1 Reaction from some GNU Software Developers]

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== Spam-Blocking Techniques ==
Domain Blocking 
A spam-blocking technique which consists of redirecting to "junk" email boxes or filtering entirely all emails from specific web domains which have been blacklisted for spamming in the past.
*Advantages:
**Domain-level blocking is an easy and cost-effective way to curtail large numbers of email addresses from which spam is sent. The blocking of a single domain can block an infinite number of possible addresses in that domain.
**Blacklists used for domain-level blocking may be shared among numerous email providers, thus protecting subscribers to one service from spam sent to subscribers of any collaborating service.
**As there is typically a fee associated with acquiring a domain, spammers using blocked domains must pay to purchase a new domain if they are blacklisted.
*Disadvantages
**Though purchasing domains is associated with a cost, it is typically a marginal expense and well within the budget of major spammers worldwide. Thus, blocking a domain does little to prevent a spammer from spamming from a different domain.
**Though spam may originate from one address in a domain, blocking the entire domain may result in the blacklisting of multiple addresses of individuals or corporations which have not engaged in spam, and therefore should not have the receipt of their mail blocked.
**When a web domain previously blacklisted changes ownership, the new owners may remain blacklisted due to the actions of the previous owners, and at no fault of their own.
**Much spam is sent through "spoofed" email addresses in which the sending domain is misrepresented. Blocking such a domain may prevent the receipt of email from a domain which is not associated with spam.
**Spam can be sent from "zombie" machines infected by malware which sends spam, but owned by individuals unaware that their machines are engaging in spamming. Blocking the domains of these machines would block the receipt of mail from innocent users.
**Spam, especially spam from "zombie" machines, can come from typically reputable domains with thousands or millions of users. Blocking such domains may degrade the quality of email service provided to a service's users to an unacceptable level. 
Is it Ethical? 
With so many ways to accidentally block non-spamming email addresses, the ethics of domain-level blocking are questionable at best. The goal of blocking spam is to make email more productive by eliminating messages which would clearly be considered "junk" by the vast majority of users. Taking a serious chance on intercepting email from well-intentioned addresses, therefore, runs counter to the goal of making the communications more productive. Perhaps with a feature to unblock specific addresses from a domain and to receive all messages from a "junk" mailbox, this strategy would be more acceptable. In its most basic form, however, the high probability of blocking non-spamming users challenges this method's claim to validity. 
See Also: 
*[http://www.joewein.de/sw/spam-bl-e.htm List of Blacklisted Domains]
*[http://www.blacklistedip.com/ IP Blacklist Monitoring Service]
*[http://ezinearticles.com/?Blocking-Domain-Spam-Senders&id=374858 Article on Spam which Includes Domain Blocking]

Prior Approval 
A spam-blocking technique in which a sender must request the permission of either a user or an email provider before mail can be received by that user or a client of that provider. This generally takes one of two forms, either the use of a CAPTCHA which a sender must pass in order for an email to be delivered, or a whitelist, controlled by a recipient, which explicitly states the only addresses from which email is received. 
CAPTCHA Approach
*Advantages:
**Completely eliminates the ability of computer controlled spamming "bots" to send mail to an address.
**Allows all mail from human users who can and will evaluate the CAPTCHA, thereby avoiding forcefully blocking well-intentioned human-sent mail.
**Discourages spam sent from human sources to many addresses, as such sending would involved the evaluation of numerous CAPTCHAs
*Disadvantages:
**For the same reason that this method discourages spam sent from humans to many addresses, it also discourages worthwhile messages sent to many addresses.
**Eliminates or severely hampers the user's ability to receive solicited automated emails.
**Does not strictly eliminate spam from human sources.
**Prevents the receipt of mail from the young, the old, the disabled, or others who may be incapable of evaluating the CAPTCHA
**Depending on the implementation of the system, a sender may not expect to be required to complete a CAPTCHA confirmation, and may assume that his or her message has been sent when it has not.
**Rather than eliminating the burden of wasted time and stress imposed by spam, this approach merely shifts it from the receiver to the sender, and imposes it for all emails rather than just spam. 
**Advancing technology makes designing CAPTCHAs which are one step ahead of computer readability increasingly difficult with time. 
Is it Ethical? 
At face value, the CAPTCHA Prior Approval method for controlling spam seems inherently more ethical than the domain blocking approach. However, this approach, too, has the potential to block solicited emails, both from automated services and from those without the ability, knowledge, expectation, or patience to fill out CAPTCHA forms. It could therefore be argued that this approach unfairly targets and limits the ability of various demographic groups, mentioned above, to send email. However, the biggest ethical challenge to the CAPTCHA approach is to ask what, exactly, it does to eliminate the burdens of spam. After all, the act of eliminating spam is hardly an end in and of itself. The point of all spam-controlling technologies is to save time, stress, and annoyance for the users of email. It could be legitimately argued that this approach, while it does cut down on the number of spam messages received by an address, itself creates the same sort of burdens which spam imposes, and thereby does little or nothing to improve the usability of email. The burden of one spam message is merely the time and effort required to read a subject line, identify a message as spam, and click the "delete" button. The CAPTCHA approach eliminates automated spam, and should be lauded for that fact. However, it isn't too far-fetched to say that more time and effort is required to evaluate and answer a CAPTCHA, sometimes multiple times, depending on a user's skill or experience with the tests, than would be required to delete, en-masse, the spam which would be received if this technique were not used at all. In essence, then, this approach merely shifts the burden of wasted time from sender to recipient, and to force such a waste of time on someone who may be busy, who may be sending an important email, is arguably just as unethical as forcing a recipient to delete messages at a time of his or her own choosing.
 
The Whitelist Approach 
*Advantages:
**Allows a user complete and total control over from whom the user wishes to receive email.
**Completely blocks all unwanted mail from addresses which are not pre-approved.
*Disadvantages:
**Fails to block any unsolicited or unwanted messages from pre-approved addresses.
**Blocks all email from addresses not pre-approved, regardless of content, sender, situation, or potential benefit to the recipient.
**Eliminates the user's ability to receive desired or solicited email from unknown addresses.
Is it Ethical? 
Certainly, it would be difficult to defend the ethical nature of forcing users of an email service to employ a whitelist of approved addresses. Whether for business or personal use, the importance of receiving mail from unknown addresses - friends with new or changed email addresses, business associates, new contacts, new clients, individuals who discovered a business via the web - is undeniable in daily life. This approach may eliminate nearly all spam messages, with the exception of spam from individuals the recipient knows, but in the process it impacts the usability of email overall in a very severe, very negative fashion. For many purposes, if an email address cannot receive mail from unknown addresses, it is entirely useless. This approach essentially elevates the errors of the domain blocking approach to an entirely new level of severity. While it may be valuable for applications such as parental controls and monitoring of children on the Internet, this approach is essentially useless for the purpose of blocking spam alone. To force it on a user is to offer a substandard email service, which may be unethical and is certainly undesirable. That said, however, there seems to be nothing wrong with allowing users to choose a whitelist option for controlling email, should they so desire. For a particular email address with specific uses and only a few potential senders, or for an individual who does not wish to be bothered by any unsolicited email whatsoever and who doesn't mind the hassle of learning of new individuals' email addresses by another means, this is an entirely viable option. It is hardly unethical, of course, for a user to choose to seclude themselves from all but a handful of email addresses voluntarily. 
Note that a combination of the above two approaches eliminates many of the problems posed by each. The use of a CAPTCHA authentication system, along with a whitelist of addresses for which the CAPTCHA is bypassed, is a particularly good solution relative to the others discussed here. In such a scenario, unknown email may be received, but spam is effectively blocked or made time-prohibitive. Many of the problems with the CAPTCHA scheme are addressed, as a CAPTCHA only needs to be completed once, after which an address can be added to a user's whitelist, and unrestricted communication may continue. 
See Also:
 
[http://www.captcha.net/ The CAPTCHA Project] 
[http://www.earthlink.net/software/free/spamblocker/faq/ Earthlink SpamBlocker FAQ - CAPTCHA/Whitelist Approach] 
[http://www.netmanners.com/email-whitelist-etiquette.html Article Explaining and Instructing in the Use of Whitelists]
 
Charge for Sent E-Mail 
A method which consists of levying a fee against the sender of an email for each message sent, akin to the electronic equivalent of a postage stamp 
*Advantages:
**Eliminates the positive revenue of sending spam messages, making their sending an undesirable business practice.
**Provides revenue ostensibly for the upkeep and improvement of email networks
*Disadvantages:
**Could make mass emails cost-prohibitive for individuals who need to send out large numbers of messages, or for non-profit organizations.
**Users who already pay between ten and fifty dollars each month for internet service are likely to react poorly to being told that they have to pay more for emails.
**Raises the cost of internet access in general, making it less affordable to lower-income individuals.
**Logistically, imposing a fee on such a global medium as email would prove difficult if not impossible.
**Distribution, use, and escalation of the fee would probably become an issue in time. 
Is it Ethical? 
The ethical nature of imposing a fee for emails is hardly a cut-and-dry question. There does not seem to be anything unethical about charging a reasonable price for a service rendered, and using the revenue from that fee in a responsible manner. However, many would say that it is unethical to charge an exorbitant or excessive fee, or to use the revenue generated by such a fee for irresponsible purposes. Some would argue that current Internet Service Provider charges are already excessive, and that adding a fee for email would only exacerbate an already prevalent problem. One essential question comes down to whether the fee for sent emails is to be used specifically to discourage spam, or whether internet providers might come to rely upon it as another stream of revenue, and as such, seek to maximize the profits they could gain from the fee by consistently raising the price of sending an email. Clearly, the ethics of one use of the fee are an entirely different matter than the ethics of the other. Also, with email being such a pervasive and worldwide phenomenon as it is, the logistics of ethically levying the fee across national boundaries, in various currencies, and in areas where corruption of public office runs rife, becomes a serious issue. It goes without being said that no first-world organization would like to propose a global fee structure which, in another part of the world, might help to finance corrupt leaders, oppressive and inhumane public policies, or terrorism. Thus, the question to whom, ultimately, the revenue of the fee is to be distributed must also be addressed. Also, it would be undesirable for respectable nonprofit organizations to be effectively banned from using mass emails through an inability to afford the necessary postage cost. However, provided that all of these issues could be settled satisfactorily, that there could be exceptions, as with United States postage, for nonprofit organizations, that the revenues were used ethically and fairly, and that the fee was nominal at most, charging a fee for emails sent does seem to be, when properly handled, an ethical proposal. 
See Also: 
[http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2006/02/email_postage.html AOL to Consider Charging for Emails] 
[http://www.infowars.com/articles/ps/internet_tax_email_tax_is_coming.htm Article on a Possible Email Tax] 
[http://www.snopes.com/business/taxes/bill602p.asp An Email Tax Hoax Exposed]
 
Opt-In for Commercial E-Mail 
A technique in which all commercial senders of email would require for a user to take action to choose to have commercial email sent to their address before they would receive any such mailings. 
*Advantages:
**Eliminates all unsolicited commercial emails.
**Allows the user to receive any commercial emails which he or she may choose.
**Does not limit messages sent for personal or nonprofit use.
*Disadvantages
**Disallows any potentially desirable commercial emails of which the user is not aware.
**Requires that companies use other, typically more expensive media to initially contact potential customers.
Is it Ethical? 
Opt-in commercial mailings eliminate all commercial emails not specifically solicited, and, contrary to all above approaches, do nothing to limit or discourage personal or nonprofit use of email in the process. Perhaps it could be argued that requiring all commercial emails to be opt-in would impose somewhat of a burden on companies, but with the availability of other forms of advertising, especially Internet advertising, this would be a marginal burden at worst, and a small price to pay for the near-total elimination of spam. While there are still some minor issues with this solution, such as the possibility that users might occasionally get a spam message that they end up putting to good use, these such concerns are not exactly ethical in nature, and, all in all, the solution of requiring opt-in lists for commercial emails seems like an ethical way to address the problem of spam. However, in practicality, so-called opt in selections are by set to send emails by default, making them, in fact, the much less-desirable form of an opt-out program.
 
See Also 
[http://www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3499691 Building an Opt-In Email List] 
[http://www.spamhaus.org/mailinglists.html Comparison of Various Opt-In / Opt-Out Programs as Related to Spam] 
[http://www.spambutcher.com/art1/486278/ Commentary on the Ambiguity of "Opt-In" Programs]
 
Escrow Bonds
A concept which involves email senders to pay an amount to an escrow service, the sum of which is released back to the sender if a message is not marked by the recipient as spam, but is lost if the message is identified as spam. Variations include adding whitelists for which the escrow is bypassed, and blacklists for which the deposit is automatically lost. 
*Advantages:
**Imposes a fee for emails which is only charged in the case of messages identified as spam.
**Makes spam cost-prohibitive while all other emails, commercial or otherwise, remain free.
*Disadvantages:
**Requires the financing of third-party escrow agencies, allowing a new avenue of exploitation of the fee.
**Necessitates an effective online micro-payment system.
**Allows for the charging as spam of any messages marked as spam, perhaps accidentally, falsely, or maliciously, by the recipient.
**Requires that the logistics of independent escrow agencies for all emails sent in any countries be satisfactorily addressed.
Is it Ethical? 
The concept of an independent escrow system for emails does not inherently seem to pose any sort of ethical dilemma. Such a scenario appears to address many of the concerns with the email postage solution, as, in this scheme, all non-spam emails are free. However, while the concept does not pose any ethical concerns in principle, in practice, several problems arise. Mainly, financing of the escrow services could possibly lead to concerns. Multiple tiers of service, high costs, or "preferred" senders who could bypass escrow blacklists with spam could lead to corruption which would be, in all practicality, unethical. 
See Also 
[http://8stars.org/a/2003/03/13/more-on-fighting-spam/ A Spam Escrow Proposal] 
[http://www.si.umich.edu/about-SI/news-detail.htm?NewsItemID=416 University of Michigan Proposal for A Spam Escrow Service] 
[http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Spam%20economics-abm.pdf PDF Presentation on an Economic Bond Solution to Spam]

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